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INTRODUCTION

More than forty years after it passed, the Hyde Amendment, a ban
on the Medicaid funding of abortion, is once again at the center of the
abortion wars.1 Hillary Clinton ran in the 2016 Presidential election
© Copyright held by the NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW. If you would like to submit a response to this Article in the Nebraska Law Review Bulletin, contact our Online
Editor at lawrev@unl.edu.
* Mary Ziegler is the Stearns Weaver Miller Professor at Florida State University
College of Law. She would like to thank Khiara Bridges, Courtney Cahill, Glenn
Cohen, Neal Devins, Dov Fox, Maya Manian, Kimberly Mutcherson, Carol
Sanger, Elizabeth Sepper, and Nat Stern for agreeing to share their thoughts on
this piece.
1. For coverage of the amendment’s legacy and anniversary, see, for example, Kate
Bahn & Jamila Taylor, The Hyde Amendment Punishes Poor Women—and It’s
Bad for the Economy, NATION (Sept. 30, 2016), https://www.thenation.com/article/
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on a platform calling for the reversal of the Amendment,2 and a proposal to overturn the Amendment has well over one hundred co-sponsors.3 Following the election of Donald Trump and Republican
majorities in both houses of Congress, the odds that the Hyde Amendment will be repealed have declined considerably; indeed, Trump has
promised to make the Hyde Amendment a permanent law rather than
an appropriations bill.4 The amendment remains at the epicenter of
abortion conflict.
For the most part, critics of the Hyde Amendment argue that it
authorizes discrimination against poor women. Using original archival research, this Article argues that the impact of the Hyde Amendment has been much further reaching. Champions of the Hyde
Amendment defined a right of conscience-based objection that increasingly defines conflicts over same-sex marriage, contraceptive access,
and abortion.5 During the fight for the amendment, pro-lifers
refocused debate about conscience on the symbolic, rather than tangible, burden placed on believers with moral objections—a move that

2.

3.

4.

5.

the-hyde-amendment-punishes-poor-women-and-its-bad-for-the-economy [https:/
/perma.unl.edu/5YZG-X84E]; Forty Years Later, 2 Million Children Saved Because of the Hyde Amendment, NAT’L RIGHT TO LIFE NEWS (Sept. 30, 2016), http://
www.nationalrighttolifenews.org/news/2016/09/40-years-later-2-million-childrensaved-because-of-the-hyde-amendment/#.WBDxIOArLb0 [https://perma.unl.edu/
KH9G-KT5D]; Michael J. New, The Hyde Amendment’s Lasting Legacy, HILL
(Sept. 30, 2016), http://origin-nyi.thehill.com/blogs/congress-blog/healthcare/2986
18-the-hyde-amendments-lasting-legacy [https://perma.unl.edu/NU2U-9RB8].
On Clinton’s call for putting an end to the Hyde Amendment, see Emma Green,
Democrats Are Pushing to Use Tax Dollars to Support Abortion, ATLANTIC (Oct. 3,
2016), http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2016/10/hyde-repeal/502568
[https://perma.unl.edu/TNL6-W3KH]; Nina Liss-Schultz & Hannah Levintova,
Today Is the Fortieth Anniversary of a Dark Day in Abortion-Rights History,
MOTHER JONES (Sept. 30, 2016), http://www.motherjones.com/politics/2016/09/supreme-court-hyde-abortion-federal-funding-mcrae [https://perma.unl.edu/WE3AHBD8].
On the new proposal in Congress, see, for example, Erin Corbett, How to Help
Repeal the Hyde Amendment—and Why It’s Time, BUSTLE (Sept. 30, 2016), https:/
/www.bustle.com/articles/186908-how-to-help-repeal-the-hyde-amendment-andwhy-its-time [https://perma.unl.edu/37QC-ZE4N]; Green, supra note 2.
See Dave Andrusko, On Fortieth Anniversary: Trump Vows Support for Hyde
Amendment, Clinton Pledges to End Hyde Amendment, NAT’L RIGHT TO LIFE
NEWS (Sept. 30, 2016), http://www.nationalrighttolifenews.org/news/2016/09/on40th-anniversary-trump-vows-support-for-hyde-amendment-clinton-pledges-toend-hyde-amendment/#.WC8Cr_krLb0 [https://perma.unl.edu/7YP9-R9QG].
On the importance of conscience politics in constitutional dialogue, see, for example, Elizabeth Sepper, Doctoring Discrimination in the Same-Sex Marriage Debates, 89 IND. L.J. 703 (2014); Reva B. Siegel & Douglas NeJaime, Conscience
Wars: Complicity-Based Claims in Law and Politics, 124 YALE L.J. 2516 (2015);
Robin Fretwell Wilson, When Governments Insulate Dissenters from Social
Change: What Hobby Lobby and Abortion Conscience Clauses Teach Us About
Specific Exemptions, 48 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 703 (2014).
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laid the foundation for the expansion of conscience-based arguments
in later years.6
Constitutionally, the fight for the Hyde Amendment also revamped
the right–privilege distinction (or the distinction between positive and
negative rights) in constitutional law. Proponents of the amendment
recognized that in a series of cases about welfare benefits, the Supreme Court had viewed the distinction with skepticism. Pro-lifers
tried to revive the distinction by urging the Court to focus on whether
the obstacles facing a woman seeking abortion were created or controlled by the government rather than by outside forces. This approach has influenced both abortion doctrine and constitutional law
more broadly.
Although the Hyde Amendment seems to be a permanent feature
of the political landscape, the Court’s recent decision in Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt makes a challenge to the Amendment both
realistic and compelling.7 The Court explained that Casey’s “undue
burden” test requires a balancing of the benefits and burdens created
by any abortion law, including a fetal-protective regulation.8 As importantly, the Court’s decision rejects the formalism that once defined
abortion jurisprudence.9 In determining whether a law burdens abortion, the Court looks beyond the formal terms of a law to the way it
interacts with forces beyond the government’s control.10 Whole Woman’s Health undermines the core premises of both the Hyde Amendment and the Supreme Court decisions upholding it.
The Court’s approach to the undue burden test casts doubt on the
constitutionality of the Hyde Amendment and a new generation of
abortion restrictions patterned on it, including bans on malpractice
insurance for abortion providers, limits on private-insurance coverage
for abortion, and laws defunding organizations that advocate or provide abortions. Whole Woman’s Health requires a court to scrutinize
the claimed benefit of an abortion regulation. Proponents of the
amendment have argued that it benefits taxpayers by ensuring they
are not complicit in facilitating a procedure that many find morally
objectionable.11 However, even when it comes to standing, taxpayers
challenging a law need to show that they have “sustained or [are] immediately in danger of sustaining some direct injury as the result of
its enforcement and not merely that he suffers in some indefinite way
in common with people generally.”12 There is no proof that the Hyde
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.

See infra Part II.
See Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt, 136 S. Ct. 2292 (2016).
See id. at 2309–10.
See id.
See id.
See infra Part I.
Hein v. Freedom from Religion Found., 551 U.S. 587, 599 (2007) (citing Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447, 448 (1923)).
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Amendment protects individuals with conscience-based objections
from a direct burden or injury more than any other spending measure
would.
Whole Woman’s Health also casts the effect of the Hyde Amendment in a new light. The Court defines impermissible burdens far
more broadly, dignifying the impact of delays, significant cost increases, and declines in the quality of care.13 Moreover, Whole Woman’s Health also instructs courts to stop looking at the formal terms
of a law in isolation. By exploring how a law interacts with market
forces, hospital policies, and individuals’ economic circumstances,14
the Court rejected the approach long used to justify the Hyde Amendment and a variety of new laws based on it.
The remainder of this Article proceeds in four parts. Parts II and
III trace the influence of the Hyde Amendment on key dimensions of
contemporary constitutional dialogue. Part II considers how proponents of the Hyde Amendment redefined conscience-based objection,
dropping any requirement for direct injury or involvement on the part
of taxpayers. Part III traces the deployment of formal distinctions between positive and negative rights in the Hyde Amendment debate.
Drawing on this history, Part IV reconsiders the constitutional case
against the Hyde Amendment and similar laws under Whole Woman’s
Health, and Part V offers a brief conclusion.
II. THE HYDE AMENDMENT AND THE REDEFINITION
OF CONSCIENCE
Conscience-based objections seem to be everywhere in contemporary constitutional debate. States have introduced exemptions for
cake bakers, ministers, government workers, counselors, and many
others who object to same-sex marriage.15 Conscience is at the center
of attacks on the contraceptive mandate of the Affordable Care Act.16
13. Hellerstedt, 136 S. Ct. at 2309–10.
14. See id.
15. On the wide variety of conscience-based objections introduced by state lawmakers
for those with objections to same-sex marriage, see, for example, Douglas
NeJaime, Marriage Inequality: Same-Sex Relationships, Religious Exemptions,
and the Production of Sexual Orientation Discrimination, 100 CAL. L. REV. 1169,
1169–72 (2012); Sepper, supra note 5, at 704–08.
16. See, e.g., Lara Cartwright-Smith & Sara Rosenbaum, Controversy, Contraception,
and Conscience: Insurance Coverage Standards Under the Patient Protection Affordable Care Act, 127 PUB. HEALTH RPT. 541, 541–45 (2012); Siegel & NeJaime,
supra note 5, at 2516–30; Robin Abcarian, At Supreme Court, Baffling Decision
Follows Awful Hobby Lobby Ruling, L.A. TIMES (July 7, 2014), http://www.la
times.com/local/abcarian/la-me-ra-supreme-court-baffling-decision-20140707-col
umn.html [https://perma.unl.edu/7HZM-ML9S]; N.Y. Times Editorial Bd., Limiting Rights: Imposing Religion on Workers, N.Y. TIMES, June 30, 2014, at A20,
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/07/01/opinion/the-supreme-court-imposing-religion
-on-workers.html.
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Antiabortion groups use the idea of conscience in justifying new legal
restrictions, including bans on private-insurance coverage for
abortion.17
While the omnipresence of conscience arguments is new, the particular claims that now attract so much attention developed decades
earlier as part of the campaign for the Hyde Amendment. The effort to
ban public funding for abortion began almost before the ink had dried
on the Roe v. Wade opinion.18 To be sure, before the Hyde Amendment
passed, opponents of abortion focused on a fetal-protective constitutional amendment, not a funding ban.19 Nevertheless, between 1973
and 1976, conscience-based arguments—forged in the battle for a
funding ban—became a central dimension of pro-life advocacy. At
first, in state battles about funding bans, supporters primarily emphasized that nonmedical abortions fell outside the scope of Medicaid, a
law designed to cover only needed health procedures.
By the mid-1970s, as this Part next demonstrates, the issue of conscience had moved to the forefront. Abortion-rights supporters prioritized a challenge to efforts on the part of Catholic hospitals to deny
abortions, convincing some pro-lifers that an attack on believers’ religious objections to abortion was underway. But as this Part establishes
next, the ideas of conscience developed in the context of defending
Catholic hospitals spread far more broadly. Pro-lifers’ claims about
conscience departed from the ones that had defined protest against
the Vietnam War. Rather than looking at the degree of involvement a
believer had, pro-lifers urged lawmakers to focus on the symbolic result of a spending bill: absent a funding ban, pro-lifers would be compelled to pay for abortion and thereby speak a message about the
morality of abortion that they could not stomach. This idea of conscience has cast a lasting shadow. No matter how indirect a believer’s
involvement, symbolic complicity has served as a powerful tool for
those seeking an exemption from otherwise applicable obligations.
A.

Pro-Lifers Develop an Argument for Public-Funding Bans

Conscience-based arguments for funding bans were not initially a
major part of antiabortion strategy. Indeed, in the early years after
the Court’s decision in Roe, abortion opponents privileged an amendment to the Constitution that would ban abortion coast to coast.20 In
spite of the movement’s preoccupation with a constitutional amend17. See, e.g., Siegel & NeJaime, supra note 5, at 2554–55.
18. See, e.g., MARY ZIEGLER, AFTER ROE: THE LOST HISTORY OF THE ABORTION DEBATE
49 (2015).
19. See, e.g., id. at 37–41.
20. See, e.g., DANIEL K. WILLIAMS, DEFENDERS OF THE UNBORN: THE PRO-LIFE MOVEMENT BEFORE ROE V. WADE 4–8, 162, 229, 236 (2016); ZIEGLER, supra note 18, at
37–41.
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ment, pro-lifers also considered a variety of incremental restrictions,
including state or federal bans on the public funding of abortions.21 At
a 1973 meeting, members of the National Right to Life Committee
(NRLC) framed a funding ban primarily as a way to protect poor, minority women from abuse.22 This argument, honed in the lead-up to
Roe, tied the movement for abortion rights to past campaigns for population control or eugenic legal reform.23 While this argument glossed
over differences in the membership and goals of these movements,
pro-lifers took advantage of the fact that some supporters of abortion
rights used the language of population control or had ties to racialist
organizations.24 For this reason, at the February meeting, pro-lifers
presented the issue as one involving racism and “protection of the welfare client.”25
After the Roe decision, supporters of abortion rights immediately
became concerned about women’s access to the procedure.26 Many
communities did not yet have freestanding clinics performing the procedure,27 and many Planned Parenthood affiliates, the leading reproductive-health provider in many locales, remained reluctant to
perform abortions in the 1970s.28 While more hospitals performed
abortions in the 1970s than would be the case in later decades,29
smaller towns served by Catholic hospitals sometimes lacked access to
abortion care.30
The application of Medicaid to abortion services also raised questions about access. Even before Roe, the New York State Commis21. On the incremental restrictions proposed in the 1970s, see, for example, ZIEGLER,
supra note 18, at 230–37.
22. National Right to Life Committee Strategy Meeting Minutes (Feb. 11, 1973), in
THE NATIONAL RIGHT TO LIFE COMMITTEE PAPERS (on file in Box 4, Gerald Ford
Memorial Library, University of Michigan).
23. See, e.g., JOHANNA SCHOEN, ABORTION AFTER ROE: ABORTION AFTER LEGALIZATION
175–76 (2015); ZIEGLER, supra note 18, at 115–16.
24. See, e.g., Brief of Women for the Unborn as Amicus Curiae in Support of Appellee
at 16, Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (No. 70-18). For more on these arguments, see, for example, Mary Ziegler, Roe’s Race: The Supreme Court, Population Control, and Reproductive Justice, 25 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 1, 29–30 (2013).
25. National Right to Life Committee Strategy Meeting Minutes, supra note 22, at 3,
5.
26. See, e.g., SCHOEN, supra note 23, at 11, 43.
27. See JENNIFER NELSON, MORE THAN MEDICINE: A HISTORY OF THE FEMINIST WOMEN’S HEALTH MOVEMENT 58–59 (2015); SUZANNE STAGGENBORG, THE PROCHOICE MOVEMENT: ORGANIZATION AND ACTIVISM IN THE ABORTION CONFLICT 67
(1991).
28. SCHOEN, supra note 23, at 20.
29. Carol Joffe, Patricia Anderson & Jody Steinauer, The Crisis in Abortion Provision
and Pro-Choice Medical Activism in the 1990s, in ABORTION WARS: A HALF-CENTURY OF STRUGGLE, 1950–2000, at 320–24 (Rickie Solinger ed., 1998).
30. See, e.g., TAMAR CARROLL, MOBILIZING NEW YORK: AIDS, ANTIPOVERTY, AND FEMINIST ACTIVISM 154 (2015); LAURENCE TRIBE, ABORTION: THE CLASS OF ABSOLUTES
145 (1992).
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sioner of Welfare Services took the position that elective abortions
were “not medically indicated” and therefore not covered by the state’s
Medicaid program.31 Other states and cities passed laws specifically
ruling out the use of public dollars or facilities for abortion,32 and Solicitor General Erwin Griswold took the position that Medicaid should
exclude at least elective abortion.33
In states from Utah to New Jersey, in the mid-1970s, Planned
Parenthood, the ACLU, and other abortion-rights organizations challenged these laws, arguing that they violated the right to abortion recognized in Roe.34 These early cases emphasized that under Roe,
abortion already counted as a necessary medical procedure that could
not be properly excluded from a state Medicaid program or prohibited
in certain hospitals.35 Moreover, according to the ACLU and Planned
Parenthood, Roe had made it unconstitutional to restrict access to
abortion in the first trimester, regardless of whether that restriction
took the form of a direct prohibition or a funding limitation.36 What
mattered was the effect of a law. As one ACLU officer reasoned: “The
combination of the only hospitals in the area refusing to perform abortions on demand, and the State’s refusal to pay Medicaid for the procedure, effectively denies them the right to abortion in the first three
months of pregnancy.”37
Before 1975, federal courts generally sided with supporters of abortion rights. In Doe v. Wohlgemuth, the court reasoned that Roe had
already “recognized that abortion is a necessary medical service for it
may prevent specific and direct harm which is medically diagnosable
(e.g. psychological harm), may protect the woman’s future mental and
physical health, and may prevent the distress associated with the unwanted pregnancy and child.”38 Even if a Medicaid regulation covered
only necessary services, abortion would qualify.39
The court also emphasized that Roe had ruled out any regulation
that interfered with a woman’s abortion decision in the first trimester.40 By putting a thumb on the scale in favor of childbirth, the State
31. See, e.g., Edith Evans Asbury, Plans to Ban Abortion Medicaid Expected to Increase City’s Cost, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 3, 1971, at 26; Peter Kihss, City Sues State
over Order that Limits Abortion Payments, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 13, 1971, at 43.
32. On the spread of Medicaid funding bans after Roe, see, for example, TRIBE, supra
note 30, at 151.
33. Right to Medicaid Voluntary Abortions Denied, ATLANTA J. CONST., May 18, 1973,
at 2B.
34. See, e.g. SCHOEN, supra note 23, at 43; Joffe et al., supra note 29, at 346–49.
35. See, e.g., Michael Boylan, Suit Demands State Permit Abortions Under Medicaid,
N.Y. TIMES, June 27, 1973, at 114.
36. See, e.g., id.
37. Id.
38. Doe v. Wohlgemuth, 376 F. Supp. 173, 190 (W.D. Pa. 1974).
39. See id.
40. Id. at 192.
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had crossed a line.41 Other courts looked to the Equal Protection
Clause in striking down funding bans, relying on a line of cases involving welfare and the right to travel.42 “Once the state has undertaken
to provide general short-term hospital care,” one court explained, “it
may not constitutionally draw the line at medically indistinguishable
surgical procedures that impinge on fundamental rights.”43
Heartened by these results, the ACLU distributed a handbook on
how to sue both public and private hospitals, including those with religious objections to abortion.44 When it came to private hospitals, the
organization insisted that Catholic hospitals should be treated as
state actors because they had assumed powers of the public hospitals
and accepted so much aid from the government, including tax exemptions and federal funding.45
The threat of an attack on Catholic health care providers prompted
pro-lifers to refine conscience arguments. Eugene Schultz, the director
of legal services of the Catholic Hospital Association, warned his members that the ACLU was working to force them to perform abortions
against their conscience.46 At first, movement members primarily
made these arguments in court.47 A New Jersey trial judge sympathetic to pro-lifers ruled that no hospital should be forced to violate
the conscience of its physicians.48 Requiring a hospital “to act contrary
to the community conscience, as well as the conscience of its management, would itself be contrary to the public good,” opined Superior
Court Judge Herbert Horne in the mid-1970s.49 Early on, the ACLU
responded that this idea of conscience swept far too broadly. For example, in addressing Judge Horne’s ruling, the legal director of the
New Jersey ACLU maintained that while individual practitioners
could refuse to perform abortions for religious or moral reasons, hospitals did not have the same level of direct involvement.50
41. See, e.g., id.
42. See, e.g., Wulff v. Singleton, 508 F.2d 1211 (8th Cir. 1974), aff’d sub nom. Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U.S. 106 (1976); Doe v. Rose, 499 F.2d 1112 (10th Cir. 1974);
Doe v. Westby, 383 F. Supp. 1143 (D.S.D. 1974), vacated, Westby v. Doe, 420 U.S.
968 (1975); Wohlgemuth, 376 F. Supp. 173; Doe v. Rampton, 366 F. Supp. 189 (D.
Utah 1973).
43. Wohlgemuth, 376 F. Supp. at 191 (quoting Hathaway v. Worcester City Hosp.,
475 F.2d 701 (1st Cir. 1973)).
44. See, e.g., James Pearre, Warn Hospitals on Abortion, CHI. TRIB., Oct. 22, 1974, at
1.
45. See, e.g., id.
46. See, e.g., id.
47. For an example of these arguments, see infra note 48 and accompanying text.
48. See, e.g., Ronald Sullivan, Appeal Due in Abortion Ruling, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 15,
1974, at 88.
49. Id.
50. See, e.g., id.
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However, as pro-lifers defended new restrictions on Medicaid funding, they began pointing to an expanded idea of conscience, one that
included not only hospitals but rather any taxpayer. In Congress, in
September 1974, the Senate passed an appropriations bill sponsored
by Senator Dewey Bartlett (R-OK) that banned the Medicaid funding
of abortion unless a woman’s life was in danger.51 Bartlett initially
presented a Medicaid funding ban as a way for members of Congress
to express their own religious or moral beliefs.52 “Each member of
Congress must decide for himself whether or not permitting the use of
federal funds for abortions aids in the taking of a human life.”53
Later, pro-life state legislators began presenting themselves as
champions of the conscience of taxpayers.54 As one explained:
“[T]axpayers who believe that abortion-on-request is a crime against
humanity . . . should not be compelled to become unwilling accessories
to these self-avowed, private, personal acts of abortion, which are
grossly offensive to their social consciences.”55
B.

More Complex Conscience Arguments Emerge

In April 1975, when the Bartlett Amendment failed by a vote of
fifty-four to thirty-six, pro-lifers recognized the need for more elaborate arguments about conscience.56 Opponents of the bill, including
Senator Edward Kennedy (D-MA), argued that it would discriminate
against poor women, denying them abortion rights that everyone else
could exercise.57 Others insisted that the bill was vague, potentially
covering some forms of contraception, including intrauterine devices.58 Still others, including Senator Jacob Javits (R-NY), presented
Bartlett’s proposal as the beginning of an incremental attack on Roe.59
Senator John Pastore (D-RI) raised the issue of conscience in a
last-ditch attempt to save Bartlett’s plan.60 “If I do not believe in an
abortion,” he asked, “why should my money be paid for that purpose,
any more than I would support an amendment that said federal funds
51. See, e.g., John D. Morris, Senate Votes Bill Curbing Abortion Aid, N.Y. TIMES,
Sep. 19, 1974, at 37.
52. See Alice Hartle, Senator Bartlett to Pursue HEW Abortion Funding Ban, NAT’L
RIGHT TO LIFE NEWS, Jan. 1975, 1, 10.
53. Id.
54. See, e.g., James Ford, Letter to the Editor, Medicaid Abortions, L.A. TIMES, Oct.
15, 1974, at C4.
55. Id.
56. See, e.g., Abortion Fund Ban Rejected, ATLANTA J. CONST., Apr. 15, 1974, at 2A;
Marjorie Hunter, Senate Upholds U.S. Abortion Funds, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 11,
1975, at 28.
57. See Hunter, supra note 56, at 28.
58. See, e.g., id.
59. See, e.g., id.
60. See, e.g., Alice Hartle, Debate Hot as Bartlett Amendment Fails, NAT’L RIGHT TO
LIFE NEWS, May 1975, at 1.
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should be used in order to propagate and advance the idea of the Right
to Life?”61
Pastore’s argument offered the beginnings of an approach that antiabortion activists would develop in the next two years. He tried to
draw the conversation away from the degree of involvement that taxpayers would have in an abortion. Instead, he emphasized the expressive function of money, describing it as a form of speech. By spending
taxpayer money in a way of which some would strongly disapprove,
Congress would act in flagrant violation of the moral beliefs of voters.
Over the course of the next several years, members of NRLC refined this idea of conscience. Reverend Phillip Reilly, an NRLC member, wrote the Internal Revenue Service that he had deducted from his
taxes an amount that he believed would reflect his support of abortion
funding.62 Dexter Duggan, another NRLC leader, elaborated much
more on Reilly’s theory.63 In a letter to National Right to Life News in
the mid-1970s, Duggan laid out a theory that other abortion opponents could use.64 The principle of freedom of conscience underlying
Roe, Duggan argued, should mean that a funding ban was necessary
as well as just.65 “We hear frequently about freedom of choice for abortion,” he wrote.66 “So I must conclude that there should be freedom of
choice not to be forced to pay for this repugnant practice of permissive
abortions.”67
To be sure, the principle of freedom of conscience was the same:
people should have the freedom to make important decisions without
government compulsion. However, Duggan ignored potentially important distinctions between the two situations. Women forced to bear
children against their will faced serious consequences, some of them
highlighted by the Roe Court, including the physical impact of pregnancy and childbirth. The burden on Duggan and other taxpayers was
far less grave in financial, physical, or emotional terms. Second, the
degree of complicity or involvement on the part of the objecting individual distinguished taxpayers and women seeking an abortion. Taxpayers did not have to receive or perform abortions. Nor did taxpayers
literally put the money to pay for an abortion in women’s hands; the
government acted as an intermediary. Nevertheless, in Duggan’s
view, the idea of conscience carried equal weight in both scenarios.
61. Id.
62. See Pro-Lifers Deny Government’s Right to Tax for Abortions, NAT’L RIGHT
LIFE NEWS, May 1976, at 5.
63. See id.
64. See id.
65. See id.
66. Id.
67. Id.

TO
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The analogy Duggan drew suggested that conscience as a constitutional principle required absolute neutrality on the part of the government.68 “We also hear that the U.S. Supreme Court did not make
abortion mandatory,” he explained.69 “So it seems obvious that
neither should it be mandatory for U.S. citizens to have to pay for this
callous, inhumane practices through their tax dollars.”70 As Duggan
saw it, Roe relied on the abstract importance of liberty in important
decisions and the constitutional problems with governmental coercion.71 When it came to taxpayer funding, the Constitution and public
policy should always favor those seeking freedom from coercion.72
Duggan recognized that his analogy was not perfect, explaining
that the federal taxing power “sanitized” pro-lifers’ involvement.73
Nevertheless, because of the expressive power of money, he insisted
that the injury suffered by objecting taxpayers was as serious as any
other.74 Forcing those with moral objections to pay for something
against their conscience made these abortion opponents look “stupid
and not deeply committed . . . [or] like utter hypocrites.”75
In 1976, when Representative Henry Hyde (R-IL) presented a rider
to an appropriations bill, these ideas of conscience became an important part of the debate. Senator Pastore again picked up on the idea of
conscience honed by activists like Duggan.76 “[W]hat we are actually
doing here is sanctifying with public money something that other people morally have an objection to,” he argued.77
Opponents of Hyde’s proposal noted that antiabortion lawmakers
wanted an exemption for taxpayers that would not extend to others
with equally forceful objections to government spending.78 Senator
Birch Bayh (D-IN) argued that Hyde’s amendment would lead the nation down a slippery slope whereby taxpayers could stop almost any
form of federal spending:
This argument is very closely related to an argument that I found great sympathy with. Why should my tax dollars be used to dump napalm on defenseless civilians in Vietnam? I am opposed to the war so why should I not be able
to opt out? Once we make that exception, I do not know where it stops.79
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.

See id.
Id.
Id.
See id.
See id.
Id.
See id.
Id.
See, e.g., Alice Hartle, HEW Funding Abortion Rider in Conference, NAT’L RIGHT
TO LIFE NEWS, Aug. 1976, at 15.
77. Id.
78. See infra notes 78–79 and accompanying text.
79. TRIBE, supra note 30, at 158.
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Senator Robert Packwood (R-OR) also pressed Pastore on the similarities between those who objected to the Vietnam War and those
who opposed Medicaid funding for abortion.80 Pastore insisted that
the Hyde Amendment was different, and his colleagues emphasized
that abortion took the life of an innocent who was not an enemy combatant or hostile party.81
Nevertheless, Packwood and Bayh spotlighted one of the ways in
which the Hyde Amendment reconceptualized conscience. The
Amendment defined a form of complicity based on the symbolic value
of money. Taxpayers forced to contribute to a practice that they found
abhorrent were in some way compelled to speak in favor of that practice. But in addition to broadening the definition of conscience, prolifers also called for an exemption asserting that objection to abortion
was different from and more legitimate than other forms of protest,
including opposition to the Vietnam War. In reassuring members of
Congress that the Hyde Amendment would not lead to exemptions for
other objecting taxpayers, lawmakers and antiabortion activists suggested that moral opposition to the taking of innocent fetal life was
entitled to more deference than other forms of dissent would be.
Other members of Congress argued that the Hyde Amendment
looked only at the burdens imposed on those objecting to abortions.82
Representative Herman Badillo (D-NY) argued that the law would impose the beliefs of one group of Americans on everyone else.83 The
Amendment ignored the burdens placed on women who wished to
have abortions, providers who would have to bear higher costs, Americans who disagreed with Hyde’s view of the moral stakes of the abortion question, and even taxpayers with moral objections to other
policies that the rider suggested deserved less weight than those embodied in the Hyde Amendment.84 Nevertheless, supporters of the bill
had a clear, simple idea of conscience that resonated with members of
Congress.85 “We are talking here about the right of the people, because of their religious and moral beliefs, do [sic] not support the taking the life of a human being,” explained one supportive member.86
Following the passage of the Hyde Amendment, President Gerald
Ford approved of the idea of a Medicaid funding ban but nevertheless
vetoed the appropriations bill for reasons of “fiscal integrity.”87 Ulti80. See Hartle, supra note 76, at 15.
81. See id.
82. See Janet Grant, Pro-Life Strength Shown in Hyde Amendment Vote, NAT’L RIGHT
TO LIFE NEWS, Sept. 1976, at 1, 12–13.
83. See id. at 13.
84. See id.; Hartle, supra note 76, at 10.
85. See infra note 86 and accompanying text.
86. Grant, supra note 82, at 12.
87. See, e.g., DONALD CRITCHLOW, INTENDED CONSEQUENCES: BIRTH CONTROL, ABORTION, AND THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT IN MODERN AMERICA 202 (1999).
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mately, Congress overrode the veto, and some members opposed to the
Amendment joined the override effort.88 The reasons for the initial
success of the Amendment were complex. Arguments about discrimination against poor women rang hollow at a time when hostility to
broad welfare programs was intensifying.89 Furthermore, many opponents of the Hyde Amendment believed that the courts would strike
down the rider, leaving intact parts of the appropriations bill of which
they approved.90
In the 1970s and beyond, the political appeal of the Hyde Amendment seemed clear. The idea of conscience appealed to a large cross
section of voters and politicians, particularly when moral objections
intersected with anger about the size and cost of the welfare state.
Proponents of the Amendment also successfully made conscience into
a far more effective weapon. Antiwar protestors and other conscientious objectors had had to justify their protest by foregrounding the
degree of involvement the draft would require. Champions of the Hyde
Amendment made no effort to justify taxpayers’ objections on the
same grounds. Taxpayers were complicit enough in abortions simply
by virtue of the message sent by allowing their dollars to pay for abortions, however indirectly.
Proponents of the Hyde Amendment also suggested that some
forms of conscience-based objection deserved more support than
others. By prioritizing the rights of the innocent, pro-lifers claimed a
form of conscience-based protest that could be easily distinguished
from other objections raised by taxpayers. The Amendment set the
stage for later efforts to explain how conscience-based protest should
trump other governmental interests or even constitutional liberties.
C.

Conscience Arguments Multiply

In the years since the Hyde Amendment, conscience-based exemptions have spread rapidly. After Oregon legalized a limited form of
physician-assisted suicide in 1997, the State passed a consciencebased protection for physicians who did not want to participate in the
88. On the veto override, see, for example, Donald T. Critchlow, When Republicans
Became Revolutionaries: Conservatives in Congress, in THE AMERICAN CONGRESS:
THE BUILDING OF DEMOCRACY 703, 710 (Julian E. Zelizer ed., 2004).
89. See, e.g., NICOLE MELLOW, THE STATE OF DISUNION: REGIONAL SOURCES OF MODERN AMERICAN PARTISANSHIP 218 n.32 (2008); TRIBE, supra note 30, at 153. On the
growing unpopularity of the welfare state in the period, see, for example, NEIL
GILBERT, THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE WELFARE STATE: THE SILENT SURRENDER
OF PUBLIC RESPONSIBILITY 21–23 (2002); THEODORE R. MARMOR, JERRY L.
MASHAW & PHILIP L. HARVEY, AMERICA’S MISUNDERSTOOD WELFARE STATE: PERSISTENT MYTHS, ENDURING REALITIES 14–16 (1990).
90. See, e.g., CRITCHLOW, supra note 87, at 205–06; Ford Makes a Point of Supporting
Hyde Provision in Veto Message, NAT’L RIGHT TO LIFE NEWS, Nov. 1976, at 1.
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procedure.91 Another battle about the expanding boundaries of conscience came in the context of abortion when a pharmacist was fired
for refusing to sell Plan B, an emergency contraceptive.92 Marketed as
Plan B or Preven, the emergency contraceptive had been for sale since
1998, and sales averaged twelve to fifteen million dollars in the earlyto mid-2000s.93 Controversy about the pill grew in January 2004
when the Eckerd chain of pharmacies in Texas terminated a pharmacist who refused to prescribe the drug to a rape victim because he believed that it caused an abortion by preventing a fertilized egg from
implanting in the uterus.94
The firing made legislation protecting pharmacists’ consciencebased objections a priority for abortion opponents.95 After South Dakota passed such a law, five other states considered doing the same.96
While no two bills were identical, most shielded pharmacists from legal liability or loss of their jobs because they refused to prescribe Plan
B for reasons of conscience.97 Some laws went further, protecting
those who refused to prescribe the birth-control pill.98 “Pharmacists
are now on the front line of the abortion issue,” stated Denise Burke of
Americans United for Life (AUL).99 “No one should ever be put in the
position where they have to violate their conscience or risk losing their
job.”100
By the following year, pro-lifers began championing an approach
whereby pharmacists neither filled prescriptions themselves nor took
steps to ensure that customers could receive help elsewhere.101 Some
91. See, e.g., Jim Barnett & Dave Hogan, Assisted Suicide Ban Advances, OREGONIAN, Sept. 25, 1998, at A1; Erin Hoover Barnett, Care Providers Seek More Control over Assisted Suicide, OREGONIAN, Mar. 19, 1999, at B5; Brad Knickerbocker,
Oregon Escalates Its Heated Right-to-Die Debate, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Apr.
8, 1998, at 4.
92. See, e.g., Stephanie Simon, Pharmacists New Players in Abortion Debate, L.A.
TIMES, Mar. 20, 2004, at A18. For more on conscience and Plan B, see, for example, ROBERT K. VISCHER, CONSCIENCE AND THE COMMON GOOD: RECLAIMING THE
SPACE BETWEEN PERSON AND STATE 160–78 (2010); MARK R. WICCLAIR, CONSCIENTIOUS OBJECTION IN HEALTH CARE: AN ETHICAL ANALYSIS 145 (2011).
93. See Simon, supra note 92, at A18.
94. See, e.g., id.
95. See, e.g., id.
96. See, e.g., id.
97. See, e.g., id.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. See, e.g., Jeanne Cummings, Morning-After Pill Reshapes Debate over Abortion,
WALL ST. J., Jan. 9, 2006, at A3; Monica Davey & Pam Belluck, Pharmacies Balk
at Sex-Pill Fight and Widen Fight, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 19, 2005, at A1; Rob Stein,
Pharmacists’ Rights at Front of New Debate, WASH. POST, Mar. 28, 2005, at A01.
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pharmacists even took custody of prescriptions and refused to transfer
them to another facility.102
While the FDA continued to refuse to address whether Plan B
should be available without a prescription, states scrambled to pass
laws either expanding or restricting access to the drug.103 The “conscience clauses” still written into pharmacist-protection laws drew on
the strategy forged during the Hyde Amendment. Unlike doctors who
performed abortions themselves, pharmacists did not directly terminate any pregnancy, even if Plan B was properly considered an abortifacient. For some time, women required a physician’s prescription,
and even in later years, women retained the ultimate decision to take
the drug.
However, the idea of the conscience that developed during the fight
for the Hyde Amendment took the spotlight off the degree of complicity required by an objector. Some pharmacists borrowed from the idea
that participating in an immoral or offensive act harmed an objector
because it sent a message that the objector agreed with the act.104 “I
believe you have a right not to fill a prescription if you think it will
harm the patient or the unborn child,” reasoned one pharmacist in
2004.105
Like champions of the Hyde Amendment, supporters of pharmacist-protection acts also effectively argued that the only burdens that
mattered were those affecting the objector. Women who refused Plan
B prescriptions clearly faced concrete harms under certain circumstances. The drug worked only when taken within seventy-two hours
after unprotected sex.106 When pharmacists refused to fill a prescription, the window closed for many women, forcing them to consider
more invasive abortion procedures or carrying a potential pregnancy
to term.107 Supporters of the pharmacist-protection laws effectively
argued that burdens on moral and religious objectors were different
and more deserving of deference, particularly when opposition to abortion was involved.108
102. See Simon, supra note 92, at A18; Rob Stein, Health Workers’ Choice Debated,
WASH. POST, Jan. 30, 2006, at A1.
103. See, e.g., Marc Kaufman, Plan B Battles Embroil States, WASH. POST, Feb. 27,
2006, at A1, A7; Jonathan D. Rockoff, Plan B Battle Shifts to States, SUN, Feb. 24,
2006, at 1A, 8A.
104. See, e.g., infra note 105 and accompanying text.
105. Simon, supra note 92, at A18.
106. See, e.g., Isabel Rodrigues et al., Effectiveness of Emergency Contraceptive Pills
Between 72 and 120 Hours After Unprotected Sexual Intercourse, 184 AM. J. OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY 531, 531–537 (2001).
107. See Simon, supra note 92, at A18; Stein, supra note 102, at A01.
108. See, e.g., Davey & Belluck, supra note 101, at A1; Simon, supra note 92, at A18;
Stein, supra note 102, at A01.
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The most visible conscience-based demands arguably now apply in
the context of same-sex marriage and abortion. Starting in 2009, religious conservatives and abortion opponents used the idea of conscience
to explain the connection between the two issues.109 The 2009 Manhattan Declaration, a manifesto endorsed by Catholic and evangelicalProtestant religious leaders and conservative activists, set forth three
principles uniting conservatives with otherwise disparate aims: “the
sanctity of human life, the dignity of marriage as a union of husband
and wife, and the freedom of conscience and religion.”110
Since 2009, in the courts and legislatures, organizations sympathetic to the aims of the Manhattan Declaration made no effort to hide
their efforts to expand the idea of conscience. AUL’s model legislation,
the Health Care Freedom of Conscience Act, describes the “basic civil
right the right of all health care providers, institutions, and payers to
decline to counsel, advise, pay for, provide, perform, assist, or participate in providing or performing health care services that violate their
consciences.”111 The bill, already on the books in several states, would
expand on pharmacist-protection bills by reaching a wide variety of
actors, including social workers, counselors, and students only peripherally involved in health care delivery.112 The bill also explicitly expands the right not to pay for services to which one objects, protecting
a class of “health care payers” that includes “health maintenance organizations, health plans, insurance companies, or management services organizations.”113 The Act would protect conscience by excusing
objectors from legal liability and requiring the government to ignore
purported protected acts in the allotting of grants and other forms of
aid.114
The Health Care Freedom of Conscience Act draws on a vision of
conscience that first emerged in the battle for the Hyde Amendment.
109. See, e.g., Michelle Boorstein & Hamil R. Harris, Christian Leaders Take Issue
with Laws, WASH. POST, Nov. 21, 2009, at B1; Lillian Kwon, Over 150,000 Americans Sign Manhattan Declaration, CHRISTIAN POST (Nov. 26, 2009), http://www
.christianpost.com/news/over-150-000-americans-sign-manhattan-declaration42026 [http://perma.unl.edu/QL3T-WULM].
110. ROBERT GEORGE, TIMOTHY GEORGE & CHUCK COLSON, MANHATTAN DECLARATION
INC., MANHATTAN DECLARATION: A CALL OF CHRISTIAN CONSCIENCE (2009), http://
manhattandeclaration.org/man_dec_resources/Manhattan_Declaration_full_text
.pdf [https://perma.unl.edu/5SVT-LTPV]. For more on the significance of the Declaration, see, for example, Siegel & NeJaime, supra note 5, at 2545–48; Laurie
Goodstein, Christian Leaders Unite on Political Issues, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 20,
2009, at A22, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/11/20/us/politics/20alliance.html.
111. AMS. UNITED FOR LIFE, HEALTH CARE FREEDOM OF CONSCIENCE ACT: MODEL LEGISLATION & POLICY GUIDE FOR THE 2011 LEGISLATIVE YEAR 4 (2010), http://www
.aul.org/wp-content/uploads/2010/12/Health-Care-Freedom-of-Conscience-Act2011-LG-_2_.pdf [https://perma.unl.edu/6ERQ-QJPJ].
112. See id. at 5.
113. See id.
114. See id. at 6.
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For supporters of the Hyde Amendment, the degree of involvement in
a supposedly objectionable act no longer matters if an objector finds a
request offensive. Antiabortion taxpayers argued for the Hyde Amendment because the use of their tax money, in their view, sent an unacceptable message about pro-lifers’ sincerity, credibility, and beliefs.
AUL’s model law would similarly protect anyone who feels that her
conscience has been violated, regardless of what she is asked to do.
AUL also describes the relevant burdens in conscience analysis as
the ones impacting religious or moral objectors. The introduction to
AUL’s 2011 model law equates an effort to “eviscerate conscience”
with the “concerted campaign to force hospitals, health care institutions, health insurers, and individual health care providers to provide,
refer, and pay for abortions.”115 Those burdened by a refusal to provide health care services, including patients, do not fall under this definition of conscience—nor, as was the case with the Hyde Amendment,
do those who object to the kind of religious or moral beliefs defended
by the Act.
The conscience claims raised in challenging the contraceptive mandate of the Affordable Care Act or same-sex marriage draw on a similar logic. In Burwell v. Hobby Lobby, the Supreme Court considered a
challenge to the contraceptive mandate raised under the federal Religious Freedom and Restoration Act (RFRA), a federal statute restoring
the more exacting constitutional test for cases involving the free exercise of religion that the Supreme Court discarded in 1990.116 Conservative and religious organizations supporting the challenge built
on the case made for the Hyde Amendment’s protection of conscience,
describing the degree of direct involvement as irrelevant and privileging the conscience-based objections of some believers over others.117
One brief signed by the authors of the Manhattan Declaration and
other religious and conservative groups made the common claim that
“[t]he theological requirement that Christians comply with scriptural
commands in their occupation prohibits not only direct and personal
wrongdoing, but also the enabling, authorizing, or aiding of another in
doing what the Christian believes to be sin.”118 Religious objections, in
this analysis, deserved special solicitude. As importantly, objectors
should be able to avoid any act that even tangentially implicates their
beliefs, including indirect decisions that “enable[e], authoriz[e], or
aid[ ]” behavior of which an objector disapproves.119
115.
116.
117.
118.

Id. at 2.
134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014).
See, e.g., infra notes 118, 124, and accompanying text.
Brief of 38 Protestant Theologians et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents
at 4–5, Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. 2751 (Nos. 13-354, 13-356).
119. Id. at 4.
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Similar arguments figured centrally in Zubik v. Burwell, the most
recent challenge to the contraceptive mandate.120 Zubik involved a
challenge to the “accommodation” provision of the Affordable Care Act
regulations, which created an exemption for those with religious objections.121 To get the accommodation, organizations had to fill out a
form detailing their objections and provide a copy to an insurer or
third-party administrator.122 The challengers argued that the accommodation requirements created a substantial burden under RFRA,
again using an idea of conscience with roots in the Hyde Amendment
debate.123 As one brief explained: “The courts, like the legislatures,
recognize that one’s religious beliefs may prevent believers from any
attenuated authorization or complicity in conduct they consider to be
wrong.”124
Protests against the Supreme Court’s decision legalizing same-sex
marriage in Obergefell v. Hodges have also adopted a broad understanding of conscience. Consider the example of Mississippi’s HB
1523, the Protecting Conscience from Government Discrimination
Act.125 The bill enumerates three beliefs entitled to protection: those
involving the superiority of heterosexual marriage, the immorality of
nonmarital sex, and the illegitimacy of gender identities based on anything other than “immutable biological sex.”126 The law covers those
performing same-sex marriages, employers, public accommodations,
counselors, adoption agencies, and a variety of other actors, protecting
them against discrimination, a term defined to include almost any tax
or benefit implication.127 Just as was the case with the Hyde Amendment, the bill elevates some conscience-based objections over others
and ignores the degree of involvement required of objectors.128
The Hyde Amendment struggle gave rise to a vision of conscience
that has influenced political struggles ever since. It is worth noting
how much this idea departed from the one that was arguably the most
familiar at the time that Congress passed the Hyde Amendment.
Starting in the late 1960s, the Supreme Court decided a series of cases
120. 136 S. Ct. 1557 (2016).
121. See id. at 1559.
122. See id.; see also 78 Fed. Reg. 39,870 (July 2, 2013) (codified at 26 C.F.R. pt. 54; 29
C.F.R. pts. 2510, 2590; 45 C.F.R. pts. 147, 156) (simplifying and clarifying the
religious-employer exemption under the Affordable Care Act).
123. See Zubik, 136 S. Ct. at 1559.
124. Brief for the Ethics and Religious Liberty Commission et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 17, Zubik, 136 S. Ct. 1557 (No. 15-35).
125. H.R. 1523, 2016 Leg., Reg. Sess. § 2 (Miss. 2016).
126. See id.
127. See id. at §§ 3–4.
128. See Barber v. Bryant, 193 F. Supp. 3d 677, 717 (S.D. Miss. 2016) (reasoning that
the bill suggested that those with contravening views “hold disfavored, minority
beliefs” while privileging those who agree with section 2 and granting them “a
broad array of special legal immunities”).
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on the scope of the conscientious-objector exemption of the Universal
Military Training Service Act.129 The first case, United States v. Seeger, expanded the exemption to cover objectors who did not believe in
God in any orthodox sense.130 In a second case, United States v.
Welsh, the Court included those with ethical convictions that an objector held with the same conviction that a believer would maintain for
religious beliefs.131 The Welsh Court also emphasized the degree of
involvement that war would require of conscientious objectors.132
Welsh had refused participation in the war because he “believe[d] the
taking of life—anyone’s life—to be morally wrong.”133 The Court reasoned that denying Welsh an exemption would require him to act in
direct violation of his beliefs, forcing him to become “an instrument of
war.”134
However, the Court refused to broaden the exemption further. In
Gillette v. United States, the Court rejected the claim of objectors opposed to the war in Vietnam rather than to all wars.135 While the
Court relied primarily on the text and legislative history of the challenged statute, the majority also spotlighted the burdens that any exemption created for third parties.136 The Gillette Court suggested that
any conscience-based objection should involve a balancing of the beliefs of the objector, the threat that “the binding quality of democratic
decisions” would be jeopardized, and the fortunes of those with other
reasons for going to war or refusing to do so.137 Privileging the conscience of some objectors raised the possibility that “those who go to
war [would be] chosen unfairly or capriciously.”138
The supporters of the Hyde Amendment defined conscience far
more broadly. Pro-lifers first sought to excuse those only remotely involved in behavior that they found objectionable. Movement leaders
also dismissed the concerns of those harmed by an exemption, including those with different ideas of conscience and those who benefitted
from the enforcement of a law about which objectors complained. Finally, champions of the law suggested that it was reasonable to attach
more value to some objections than others. All of these moves became
a fundamental part of the political and legal argument for conscience
that has become a familiar feature of political and constitutional
debate.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.

50 U.S.C. § 3806 (2012).
380 U.S. 163 (1965).
398 U.S. 333 (1970).
See id. at 343.
Id.
Id. at 344.
401 U.S. 437 (1971).
See id. at 459–61.
Id. at 459.
Id. at 460.
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As Part III shows, the fight for the Hyde Amendment also helped
to shape the constitutional distinction between a right and a privilege.
Antiabortion attorneys distraught about the Roe decision began looking for a way to narrow its reach. In the funding context, AUL attorneys seized on the idea that Roe had recognized a right to privacy.
Emphasizing that privacy involved freedom from state interference,
AUL lawyers argued that the Constitution had nothing to do with
whether women could actually exercise their abortion rights. The organization promoted a kind of abortion-law formalism that ultimately
changed the direction of the Court’s jurisprudence.
While the right–privilege distinction casts a shadow over much of
constitutional law, the benefit–burden distinction pushed by AUL influenced both the Supreme Court’s decisions on state and federal
funding bans and on every dimension of abortion law. As Part III
shows, the Hyde Amendment set the stage for the adoption of a formalist approach that has distorted abortion law and other aspects of
constitutional law ever since.
III. THE HYDE AMENDMENT AND THE REVIVAL OF THE
RIGHT–PRIVILEGE DISTINCTION
The Court’s decisions in Maher v. Roe and Harris v. McRae help to
reinvigorate the right–privilege distinction in constitutional law.139
Introduced in the nineteenth century, the distinction suggests that a
law raises constitutional problems only when the government uses coercive force.140 In practical terms, however, the distinction has long
seemed problematic, particularly when the “government . . . more
often exerts its power by withholding benefits than by threatening
bodily harm.”141
In the 1960s and 1970s, under pressure from critics, the
right–privilege distinction became increasingly fragile.142 In this pe139. See, e.g., Susan Frelich Appleton, Beyond the Limits of Reproductive Choice: The
Contributions of the Abortion-Funding Cases to Fundamental-Rights Analysis
and to the Welfare-Rights Thesis, 81 COLUM. L. REV. 721, 722 (1981) (“The Court’s
decisions in McRae and Zbaraz [and Maher] clearly refine the contours of the
constitutional right to terminate a pregnancy, but even more significantly, they
provide a new analytical focus for all fundamental-rights cases.”); see also Richard L. Rubin, The Resurrection of the Right–Privilege Distinction? A Critical Look
at Maher v. Roe and Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 7 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 165 (1979)
(stating that following Roe v. Wade, there has been a “definite shift in the Supreme Court’s approach to direct and indirect burdens on constitutional rights, as
reflected in [Maher and Hayes]”).
140. See, e.g., Deborah Dinner, Recovering the LaFleur Doctrine, 22 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 343, 383–384 (2010).
141. Seth Kreimer, Allocational Rights: The Problem of Negative Rights in a Positive
State, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 1293, 1295 (1984).
142. See, e.g., Reuel E. Schiller, Enlarging the Administrative Polity: Administrative
Law and the Changing Definition of Pluralism, 1945–1970, 53 VAND. L.
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riod, the Supreme Court no longer took for granted that the government’s power to impose conditions on the receipt of benefits had no
constitutional limits.143 Indeed, in the late 1960s and early 1970s, the
Court invalidated most limits on benefits under the Aid to Families
and Dependent Children (AFDC) Program.144 Following the decision
of Maher, however, the Court began turning away most challenges to
laws on welfare benefits.145 In the aftermath of Maher and Harris, the
Court increasingly presumed the constitutionality of laws that merely
denied a benefit.146 These cases helped to revive and legitimize the
right–privilege distinction, creating a doctrinal approach that the
Court has applied in a variety of arenas.
This Part explores the legal strategy abortion opponents used to
restore a strong right–privilege distinction in constitutional law. In
the mid-1970s, antiabortion attorneys concerned about the mainstream movement’s reliance on a constitutional amendment began
searching for a litigation strategy that could help advance their cause.
Prior to Roe, lawyers had made the same fetal-rights arguments inside and outside of court, asserting that the Constitution recognized
implied fundamental rights for unborn children. Convinced that this
tactic had reached a dead end, AUL attorneys next worked to convince
the Court that Roe permitted at least some restrictions on abortion. At
first, this approach was scattershot, focusing almost entirely on the
benefits supposedly achieved by individual regulations. For these at-

143.
144.

145.
146.

REV. 1389, 1428–34 (2000) (describing the attacks that convinced “the Court [to]
repudiate[ ] the rights/privileges distinction”).
See, e.g., id. at 1428–29.
See, e.g., Youakim v. Miller, 425 U.S. 231 (1976) (invalidating exclusion of foster
children in relatives’ homes from AFDC-Foster Care benefits); Philbrook v. Glodgett, 421 U.S. 707 (1975) (invalidating exclusion of intact families from AFDC-UP
benefits because of father’s eligibility for unemployment benefits); Burns v. Alcala, 420 U.S. 575 (1975) (upholding exclusion of unborn children and their
mothers from AFDC benefits); Carleson v. Remillard, 406 U.S. 598 (1972) (invalidating exclusion of military dependents from AFDC coverage); Townsend v.
Swank, 404 U.S. 282 (1971) (invalidating eligibility distinction between school
children attending vocational schools and those attending college); King v. Smith,
392 U.S. 309 (1968) (invalidating requirement that recipients not reside or have
sexual relations with an able-bodied man, whether he is children’s father or not).
But see Heckler v. Turner, 470 U.S. 184 (1985) (upholding federal interpretation
of consolidated work-incentive disregard, which included mandatory payroll
taxes as part of lump-sum disregard); Quern v. Manley, 436 U.S. 725 (1978) (upholding state’s limited Emergency Assistance).
See, e.g., Marie A. Failinger, An Offer She Can’t Refuse: When Fundamental
Rights and Conditions on Government Benefits Collide, 31 VILL. L. REV. 834,
834–37 (1986).
See, e.g., id. For recent examples of this position, see, for example, Planned
Parenthood of Kan. & Mid-Mo. v. Moser, 747 F.3d 814, 826 (10th Cir. 2014)
(“There is a qualitative difference between prohibiting an activity and refusing to
subsidize it.”); K.P. v. LeBlanc, 729 F.3d 427, 429 (5th Cir. 2013); Planned
Parenthood of Greater Ohio v. Hodges, 201 F. Supp. 3d 898 (S.D. Ohio 2016).
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torneys, however, the funding cases offered an important opportunity
for the movement to create a master theory of abortion rights—one
that would allow activists to defend most regulations and delegitimize
Roe in the process.
As this Part shows next, in creating a more coherent plan of attack,
antiabortion attorneys reinvented the right–privilege distinction.
Without defending its pedigree in every case, antiabortion attorneys
argued that at a minimum, the distinction had analytical force when
applied to certain kinds of rights, especially those described as privacy
interests. Focusing on the kind of right at issue in a case promised a
much more modest change in constitutional law. At least superficially,
the strategy also seemed more analytically rigorous than a superficial
examination of whether a law involved a sanction or a benefit, which
required courts to explore the nature of the constitutional interest in
question.
This argument paid off in Maher and Harris. The Court reconceptualized the abortion right and constitutional privacy more broadly as
pure freedoms from state interference. In this context, the Court also
reintroduced a formal distinction between laws that burdened a constitutional interest and those that did not. Without much explanation
of what a burden entailed or how one could be identified, the Court
relied on the right–privilege distinction in evaluating abortion
regulations.
Moreover, Harris and Maher offered a workable approach for
courts seeking to distinguish negative and positive rights. Borrowing
from the arguments of abortion opponents, the Court argued that a
law did not burden constitutional rights if it had the practical effect of
putting those rights off limits unless the state created or controlled
the obstacles in an individual’s way. This approach has resonated well
beyond the abortion context.
A.

Pro-Lifers Look for a New Litigation Strategy

In the later 1970s, when antiabortion attorneys began work on the
funding cases, the future of the right–privilege distinction seemed anything but certain.147 In Goldberg v. Kelly, the Supreme Court rejected an argument that welfare benefits were a privilege rather than
a right and held that certain procedural protections had to be in place
before benefits were denied.148 The Court consistently overturned limits on AFDC benefits for much of the 1960s and early 1970s.149
The antiabortion movement also saw little reason to be hopeful
about the potential of litigation. In the late 1960s and early 1970s,
147. See, e.g., Schiller, supra note 142, at 1429–34.
148. 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
149. See, e.g., Failinger, supra note 145, at 834–837.
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many movement lawyers had remained confident that the courts
would recognize constitutional fetal rights if presented with the right
evidence.150 Martin McKernan, the head of the NRLC legal team, advised movement attorneys to play to their strengths—highlighting ultrasounds and other scientific evidence supporting the idea of fetal
personhood and leveraging the recognition of fetal rights in contract,
tort, and property law.151 McKernan explained:
All in all, the law has consistently established certain procedural safeguards
around fundamental rights to which the unborn was entitled. That most fundamental of rights—not to be deprived of life without due process of the law—
cannot be ignored. However, these arguments must be demonstrated to any
court . . . through the intervention of interested state right-to-life groups. In
one federal court challenge to a state abortion statute a doctor was allowed to
enter the case as an intervenor on behalf of all unborn children in that
state.152

As McKernan’s comments suggested, prior to Roe, abortion opponents pursued a litigation strategy that closely tracked activists’ political arguments about fetal humanity and fetal rights.153 NRLC
popularized slideshows of abortion to spread the movement’s arguments about fetal personhood and the violence of abortion.154 Both
AUL and NRLC tied these images to an implied constitutional right
that abortion opponents identified in the Declaration of Independence
and the Fourteenth Amendment.155
Litigators looked to the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses
as vehicles for this idea of fetal life. To establish that the fetus deserved equal protection of the laws, movement lawyers hoped to
demonstrate that “the unborn child [would] qualify as a person within
the purview” of the Fourteenth Amendment.156 The medical claims
and fetal images that the movement had popularized in the political
arena could convince judges “factually that abortion destroys an individuated and unique human life.”157 By exposing the courts to scien150. See ZIEGLER, supra note 18, at 42–43.
151. See, e.g., Martin McKernan, Legal Report: Court Cases 1–4 (July 1972), in THE
NATIONAL RIGHT TO LIFE COMMITTEE PAPERS (on file in Box 4, Gerald Ford Memorial Library, University of Michigan).
152. Id. at 4.
153. See, e.g., Mary Ziegler, Originalism Talk: A Legal History, 2014 BYU L. REV. 869,
869.
154. See, e.g., Carol Mason, Minority Unborn, in FETAL SUBJECTS, FEMINIST POSITIONS
145 (Lynn Marie M. Morgan & Meredith W. Michaels eds., 1999).
155. See Ziegler, supra note 153, at 869–75.
156. Note, The Unborn Child and the Constitutional Conception of Life, 56 IOWA L.
REV. 994, 997–1003 (1971); see also A. James Quinn & James A. Griffin, The
Rights of the Unborn, 31 JURIST 577, 578 (1971) (“[T]he law imputes a legal personality to an unborn child for all purposes which would be beneficial to the child
after its birth.”).
157. Robert M. Byrn, Abortion-on-Demand: Whose Morality?, 46 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
5, 16 (1970).
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tific proof, movement lawyers planned to establish that “the unborn
child is a human being and it is difficult to conceive of a human being
who is not a person.”158
The movement’s procedural due process strategy similarly relied
on medical reasoning about fetal life. Movement attorneys like David
Louisell argued that the unborn child could not be deprived of life
without due process of law.159 Again, this strategy attracted support
because it allowed pro-lifers to draw on what they saw as scientific
evidence of fetal personhood.160
A month after the Court decided Roe, NRLC affiliates went to work
proposing laws that could limit the reach of the decision.161 While activists invested some energy in the effort to “spell out at the local
level . . . what the intention of the Supreme Court is,” most abortion
opponents believed that litigation would do very little good.162 “[O]ne
does not have to be a trained lawyer to recognize that increasingly ‘the
Constitution is what judges say it is,’ ” complained one antiabortion
group in 1973.163 While the Court seemed unreceptive to any antiabortion argument, the problem for the movement went further. The
legal strategies that antiabortion lawyers had been honing for decades
had failed in the Court. It was not obvious what movement lawyers
should do next.
Nevertheless, Dennis Horan, an AUL leader, worried that the
movement had placed too much hope in an Article V constitutional
amendment.164 Horan and some of his colleagues recognized that such
an amendment would be hard to pass.165 Moreover, Horan understood
that even if abortion opponents managed to introduce a successful
constitutional amendment, the courts would have the power to interpret it.166 As a result, Horan argued for the usefulness of “a National
Public Interest law firm, which would provide a spearhead for litigation toward the ultimate goal of reversing Roe v. Wade.”167
158. Robert M. Byrn, Abortion in Perspective, 5 DUQ. L. REV. 125, 134 (1966).
159. See, e.g., David Louisell, Abortion, the Practice of Medicine and the Due Process of
Law, 16 UCLA L. REV. 233, 234 (1969).
160. See id. at 251.
161. See National Right to Life Committee Strategy Meeting Minutes, supra note 22,
at 5.
162. Id.
163. Celebrate Life Committee, Booklet 33 (1973), in THE NATIONAL RIGHT TO LIFE
COMMITTEE PAPERS (on file in Box 4, Gerald Ford Memorial Library, University of
Michigan).
164. Memorandum from Dennis Horan to Public Policy Comm., NRLC 2 (Sept. 5,
1973) (on file in Box 4, 1973 Folder, Gerald Ford Memorial Library, University of
Michigan).
165. See id.
166. See id.
167. See id.
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AUL began working on a new litigation strategy in the mid-1970s.
The organization’s first major case, Planned Parenthood of Central
Missouri v. Danforth, was the first to arrive at the Supreme Court
since Roe came down.168 Danforth involved the kind of multirestriction statute passed in many states in the mid-1970s to test the boundaries of Roe.169 In Danforth, AUL lawyers did not fully distance
themselves from the strategies that had failed in Roe.170 Indeed, the
organization’s brief highlighted “the constitutional unsoundness
of Roe v. Wade as a primary reason . . . not to extend Roe v. Wade beyond its narrowest perimeters.”171
AUL still built on existing strategies, insisting that Roe allowed for
at least some regulations of abortion.172 Consider, for example, the
organization’s analysis of the Missouri informed-consent regulation.173 The AUL brief suggested that Roe had already limited abortion rights in a way that allowed the state to require women to sign an
informed-consent form.174 “In enunciating some of the factors the doctor will necessarily consider in consultation with the woman contemplating an abortion, the court further regulated the physician’s right
to practice medicine in a way he might see fit,” AUL argued.175 “Thus
it may be seen that Roe v. Wade teaches that the right to practice
medicine, just as any other right, is a limited one at best.”176
While AUL argued that Roe allowed Missouri to pass all of the
challenged restrictions, the justification for each one was unique.
When defending a parental-consent restriction, AUL lawyers stressed
that Missouri law had already mandated the consent of a parent
before minors could get an abortion.177 The AUL brief argued that for
this reason, the state law added no “extra layer of regulation” and
placed no further burden on young women seeking an abortion.178 The
brief identified an entirely different rationale for a spousal-consent
regulation.179 “The state thus purports to find a sufficient compelling
interest in the integrity of marriage and family life to preclude unconsented abortion where the life of the wife is not endangered,” the brief
168.
169.
170.
171.
172.
173.
174.
175.
176.
177.
178.
179.

428 U.S. 52 (1976).
See id. at 52–60.
See infra note 171 and accompanying text.
Motion for Leave to File Brief and Brief for Dr. Eugene Diamond & Ams. United
for Life as Amicus Curiae Supporting Danforth at 17–18, Danforth, 428 U.S. 52
(Nos. 74-1151, 74-1419) [hereinafter Motion and Brief].
See id. at 31–81.
See id. at 81–89.
Id.
Id. at 88.
Id
See id. at 89–96.
Id. at 96–97.
See id. at 98–104.
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reasoned.180 “To protect this interest, the state acknowledges a joint
interest and power of disposition of the married parties in their unborn child.”181
Danforth was not a complete loss for AUL. The Court upheld Missouri’s informed-consent law and took seriously the State’s arguments
in favor of other regulations, including limited access to abortion in
the first trimester.182 Nevertheless, the problems with AUL’s strategy
in the case seemed evident. Much of the organization’s brief
foregrounded the need to overrule Roe altogether.183 Danforth made it
apparent that the Court was unwilling to reconsider Roe at any point
in the near future.184 Moreover, when rationalizing each individual
regulation, AUL attorneys had assumed for the sake of argument that
the Court viewed abortion as a fundamental right.185 While arguing
that there was a compelling state purpose behind every part of the
law, the brief conceded that strict scrutiny applied to every abortion
regulation because of Roe.186
AUL began developing a more comprehensive plan when the group
became involved in a series of funding cases. Maher v. Roe, the lead
case, addressed the constitutionality of a Connecticut ban on Medicaid
funding for most abortions.187 Poelker v. Doe concerned a St. Louis law
prohibiting the use of public hospitals for abortions.188 Beal v. Doe,
the third of the series, asked whether compliance with the federal Social Security Act required Pennsylvania’s Medicaid program to cover
nontherapeutic abortions.189 Working with state and local governments defending their own restrictions, AUL developed a new approach focused on the nature of the right at issue in Roe. First, AUL’s
brief in Poelker separated the right to make decisions about abortion—an interest that the organization admitted was protected under
Roe—from the ability to actually obtain an abortion.190 AUL argued
that because Roe dealt with a woman’s decisional autonomy, “the
abortional act . . . enjoys no constitutional protection in itself.”191
AUL attorneys also emphasized the fact that Roe had described the
decision to have an abortion as a matter of constitutional privacy.
180.
181.
182.
183.
184.
185.
186.
187.
188.
189.
190.
191.

Id. at 98–99.
Id.
Danforth, 428 U.S. at 65–68.
See Motion and Brief, supra note 171, at 17–30.
See Danforth, 428 U.S. at 40–68.
See Motion and Brief, supra note 171, at 13–15 (arguing that Missouri’s law
served several compelling state interests).
See id.
432 U.S. 464 (1977).
432 U.S. 519 (1977).
432 U.S. 438 (1977).
See Brief for Americans United for Life as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner
at 15, Poelker, 432 U.S. 519 (No. 75-442).
Id. at 15.
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Here, AUL borrowed from arguments for government neutrality made
in the context of the Hyde Amendment.192 If abortion involved freedom from government interference, state governments and physicians
with objections to abortion should have been free from compulsion to
help women have abortions.193 A right to choose abortion meant that
women could expect nothing from the government but neutral treatment.194 “If the abortion decision is so private,” AUL argued, “it follows that government shall not itself be compelled to respond to the
demand of the exercise of that right.”195
Working with AUL, the State of Connecticut reinforced this idea of
privacy rights, arguing that it provided a window into the nature of all
constitutional protections.196 Connecticut distinguished Maher from a
series of earlier cases involving the right to travel, many of which had
served as the foundation for abortion-rights victories in the lower
courts.197 First, Connecticut argued that the Court had never recognized a right to effectuate a constitutionally protected decision.198 Instead, at most, the Court had censured states for discriminating
against protected decisions or acts.199 Connecticut claimed that any
such discrimination was lacking in Maher: the state had chosen to
fund all medically necessary services, and elective abortion, like many
other treatments, fell outside the scope of coverage.200
Connecticut made a more influential argument that built on the
logic of AUL’s privacy reasoning. The State argued that the Constitution prohibited only laws that restricted or burdened constitutional
rights.201 Returning to the right-to-travel cases, Connecticut reinterpreted the Court’s jurisprudence.202 The Court had decided a trio of
cases that had convinced some that funding restrictions could be unconstitutional.203 Memorial Hospital v. Maricopa County struck
down an Arizona statute requiring one year’s residence in a county
before an indigent person could receive publicly funded, nonemergency medical care.204 In Shapiro v. Thompson, the Court invalidated
a Connecticut statute imposing a one-year requirement before welfare
recipients could receive public benefits.205 In Dunn v. Blumstein, the
192.
193.
194.
195.
196.
197.
198.
199.
200.
201.
202.
203.
204.
205.

See id.
See id.
See id.
Id.
See Brief of the Appellant, Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464 (1977) (No. 75-1440).
See id. at 11–19.
See id.
See id.
See id.
Id. at 13–14.
See id.
See id.
415 U.S. 250 (1974).
394 U.S. 618 (1969).
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Court held that Tennessee may not burden the right to travel by imposing a durational residency requirement of one year in the state and
three months in the county in order to be eligible to vote.206
Connecticut argued that the Court had never departed from a formal distinction between laws restricting action and laws providing
benefits.207 The durational residency requirements in Shapiro, Dunn,
and Maricopa County violated the Constitution because they prevented the plaintiffs “from receiving nonemergency medical care, . . .
public welfare benefits, . . . [or] the right to vote.”208 Because the Connecticut law neither created nor controlled such a burden, it was constitutional.209 “There is nothing in the Connecticut regulation which
prevents a woman from making a choice to have an abortion,” Connecticut insisted.210
In June 1977, the Court issued a decision in Maher, and AUL attorneys concluded that their new approach to Roe had made progress.211 When it came to the nature of the constitutional interest in
Roe, the Court emphasized that the Constitution guarded against
“governmental intrusion, physical coercion, and criminal prohibition
of certain activities.”212 The Court seemed to accept AUL’s argument
that Roe involved only the freedom to make a decision, not the ability
to effectuate any choice.213 As the Maher Court put it, “the right protects the woman from unduly burdensome interference with her freedom to decide whether to terminate her pregnancy.”214
The Court also adopted the formalist approach proposed by Connecticut.215 “There is a basic difference,” the Court explained, “between direct state interference with a protected activity and state
encouragement of an alternative activity.”216
B.

The Court Considers the Constitutionality of the Hyde
Amendment

Between 1977 and 1980, when the Court heard a constitutional
challenge to the Hyde Amendment itself in Harris, it was far from
clear how far the Court’s embrace of the right–privilege distinction
would go. The new attack on the Hyde Amendment called into ques206.
207.
208.
209.
210.
211.
212.
213.
214.
215.
216.

405 U.S. 330 (1972).
See Brief of the Appellant, supra note 196, at 13–14.
Id. at 14.
See id.
Id.
For the Court’s decision in Maher, see Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 469–76 (1977).
On AUL’s reaction to Maher, see ZIEGLER, supra note 18, at 68.
Maher, 432 U.S. at 471–72.
See id.
Id. at 473–74.
See id. at 474–75.
Id. at 475.
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tion the limits of the constitutional approach announced in Maher and
its companion cases. First, the Connecticut regulation in Maher was
arguably distinguishable from the Hyde Amendment: while Connecticut excluded only elective abortions from coverage, the Hyde Amendment denied payment for all but a handful of medically necessary
abortions.217 Those challenging the Hyde Amendment argued that for
this reason, the rider created an unconstitutional burden.218 However,
the ACLU and its allies also rejected formalism and asked the Court
to look at the purpose of the Hyde Amendment and its effect on poor
women.219 “[T]he ultimate test of whether constitutionally protected
interests are being impinged upon,” the appellees argued, “is not simply the form that the state interference takes but the effect.”220
Those challenging the Hyde Amendment also responded to the
complicity-based idea of conscience so effectively deployed by pro-lifers.221 “The Hyde Amendment . . . destroy[s] not only the guarantee of
comprehensive medical care for the poor, but also the universal guarantee of liberty of conscience,” explained the ACLU brief challenging
the amendment.222
In the ACLU’s analysis, Medicaid equally respected the beliefs of
those who objected to abortion and those for whom “conscience may
dictate the necessity of terminating an unwanted and health-threatening pregnancy.”223 True neutrality required the government not to
take sides rather than favoring those who identified as pro-life.224
Those challenging the Hyde Amendment argued that the rider thus
violated the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment, heavily
burdening the religious liberty of women who believed that an abortion was morally or religiously compelled.225 Moreover, the ACLU argued that because the Hyde Amendment privileged some consciencebased beliefs over others, the rider violated the Establishment Clause
of the First Amendment:
[T]he absence of clearly secular advocacy in the “right to life” movement for
the abortion restrictions is decisive. Its constituency, support and orientation
are largely religious and, more importantly, it asserts no independent secular
justification for the evils of abortion. Where legislation rooted in sectarian religious beliefs not widely shared is claimed to serve a secular purpose, and is
supported in the legislature and in the society at large by a predominantly
217.
218.
219.
220.
221.
222.
223.
224.
225.

Brief of Appellees at 113–34, Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980) (No. 79-1268).
See id.
See id. at 117–18.
Id. at 116 (quoting Reproductive Health Servs. v. Freeman, 614 F.2d 585, 595
(8th Cir. 1980)).
See infra note 222 and accompanying text.
Brief of Appellees, supra note 217, at 151.
Id. at 155.
See id. at 151–55.
See id. at 167–84.
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and pervasively religious constituency, the claim of secular purpose must
fail.226

Those defending the Hyde Amendment not only had to answer
these arguments but also had to justify the Maher Court’s formalist
turn. Some lawyers fell back on the separation of powers, arguing that
the courts should not second-guess Congress’s exercise of its appropriation powers.227 Intervening on behalf of Representative Hyde and
other federal defendants, AUL doubled down on the right–privilege
distinction that the organization had emphasized in Maher, insisting
that it made no difference whether the Amendment denied funding for
medically necessary procedures.228 “This is neither an ‘abortion case’
nor a right to privacy case,” AUL reasoned.229 “This case does not involve any substantive constitutional rights of persons; it involves appropriations made by the Congress for use in an economic and social
welfare program.”230 AUL maintained that all constitutional protections, including privacy, were “ ‘non-interference’ rights—freedoms or
immunities from governmental restraint or interference.”231 If a law
addressed a benefit rather than a burden, the Constitution should
play no role in the analysis.232
AUL also defended the vision of conscience that abortion opponents
had developed during the fight for the Hyde Amendment. First, the
organization argued that it was fair to privilege the conscience-based
beliefs of some over those of others because the Free Exercise Clause
would sweep far too broadly without any kind of limiting principle.233
AUL argued that if women felt compelled by conscience to terminate a
pregnancy, that should not matter unless their beliefs were “mandated by specific and affirmative corporate tenets of some religious
group.”234 Moreover, even if women had a religious objection to carrying a pregnancy to term, the government still had no obligation to pay
for anything.235 A constitutional right at most prevented the government from burdening a woman’s decision.236
Harris embraced AUL’s argument. First, the Court concluded that
it made no difference that the Amendment excluded both therapeutic
and nontherapeutic abortions.237 “Although the liberty protected by
226. See id. at 174–75.
227. See Brief of Intervening Defendants-Appellees at 28–30, Harris v. McRae, 448
U.S. 297 (1980) (No. 79-1268).
228. See id. at 7–10.
229. Id. at 8.
230. Id.
231. Id.
232. See id. at 8–10.
233. See id. at 48–51.
234. Id. at 50.
235. See id. at 48–51.
236. See id.
237. Harris, 448 U.S. at 317–318.
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the Due Process Clause affords protection against unwarranted government interference with freedom of choice in the context of certain
personal decisions, it does not confer an entitlement to such funds as
may be necessary to realize all the advantages of that freedom,” the
Court concluded.238
When it came to the Free Exercise Clause, the Court found that
none of those challenging the Hyde Amendment had standing to raise
the issue because none of them had sought an abortion for reasons of
religious compulsion.239 Nor did the Court believe that the Hyde
Amendment violated the Establishment Clause.240 Rejecting the idea
that antiabortion beliefs were necessarily religious or sectarian, the
Court reasoned that the Amendment represented “a reflection of ‘traditionalist’ values towards abortion, as much as it is an embodiment of
the views of any particular religion.”241
Harris became a foundational part of the Court’s right–privilege
canon, bolstering the idea that only constitutional “burdens” triggered
meaningful judicial scrutiny. The Court’s decision serves as a reminder of how the Hyde Amendment continues to shape contemporary
constitutional politics.
If there is no doubt about the ongoing relevance of the Hyde
Amendment, the fate of any challenge to it remains open to question.
Efforts to challenge the Amendment have fallen short before.242 The
Supreme Court has never shown any willingness to reconsider Maher
or Harris. In the 1990s, when Bill Clinton had pro-choice majorities in
both houses of Congress, Clinton’s effort to overturn the Amendment
failed.243 In today’s sharply partisan climate,244 the hope for any challenge to the Hyde Amendment may be just as dim.
However, as Part IV argues, Whole Woman’s Health provides crucial new tools for challenging the Hyde Amendment. Part IV turns
next to the implications of the Court’s decision for the Hyde Amendment and the arguments underlying it.
238.
239.
240.
241.
242.
243.

Id.
Id. at 320–322.
See id. at 319–320.
Id.
See infra note 243 and accompanying text.
See, e.g., David Rosenbaum, Clinton’s Health Plan; Defying President, Senate
Votes to Keep Medicaid Abortion Limit, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 29, 1993), http://www
.nytimes.com/1993/09/29/us/clinton-s-health-plan-defying-president-senatevotes-keep-medicaid-abortion.html. On Clinton’s plan to repeal the Hyde Amendment, see, for example, Philip J. Hilts, Clinton and Abortion: Limited Expectations, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 13, 1992), http://www.nytimes.com/1992/12/13/us/clintonand-abortion-limited-expectations.html.
244. See Partisanship and Political Animosity in 2016, PEW RES. CTR. (June 22, 2016),
http://www.people-press.org/2016/06/22/partisanship-and-political-animosity-in2016 [https://perma.unl.edu/VR7S-ST3C].
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IV. THE HYDE AMENDMENT AFTER
WHOLE WOMAN’S HEALTH
The precise impact of the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Whole
Woman’s Health remains contested. This Part argues that the Court’s
decision means something significant for the Hyde Amendment and
for the right–privilege distinction. Without formally abandoning the
idea of a line between burdens and benefits, the Court rejected the
basic method used in Maher and Harris to draw that distinction. After
Whole Woman’s Health, it no longer matters whether the government
exclusively controls and creates a disputed burden if it means that
women lose access to have an abortion.
This Part begins with an exploration of the background and holding of Whole Woman’s Health. Next, this Part shows how the Court’s
decision makes a challenge to the Hyde Amendment more realistic
and compelling.
A.

Whole Woman’s Health Redefines the Undue Burden Test

Whole Woman’s Health involved two parts of Texas’s HB 2, a law
requiring doctors performing abortions to have admitting privileges at
a hospital within thirty miles and a measure mandating that abortion
clinics comply with the regulations governing ambulatory surgical
centers (ASCs).245 However, the strategy underlying HB 2 went much
further. For much of the 1970s and the 1980s, abortion opponents had
prioritized fetal-protective laws and arguments, but after 1992, the
movement’s focus shifted to laws claimed to harm both women and
fetal life.246 Moreover, Casey itself seemed to signal the Court’s receptiveness to woman-protective arguments.247
The Court’s 1992 decision declined an invitation to overrule Roe
but set aside the trimester framework that had governed earlier abortion cases.248 In its place, Casey imposed the undue burden test, a
standard that required the invalidation of any regulation that had the
purpose or effect of placing a substantial obstacle in the path of a woman’s abortion decision.249 When applying the new standard, the
245. See TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 171.0031(a)(1) (West 2013); 25 TEX. ADMIN. CODE §§ 139.53–.56 (2014). For the ASC provision, see TEX. HEALTH &
SAFETY CODE ANN. § 245.010(a) (West 2015); 25 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 139.40
(2014).
246. See, e.g., Reva B. Siegel, Dignity and the Politics of Protection: Abortion Restrictions Under Casey/Carhart, 117 YALE L.J. 1694, 1707–12 (2008).
247. For pro-life perceptions to this effect, see, for example, Americans United for Life,
Legal and Education Highlights (1992), in THE WILCOX COLLECTION (on file in
Box 3, AUL Briefing Memo Folder, University of Kansas).
248. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 872–873 (1992) (plurality
opinion).
249. Id. at 877.
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Court upheld an informed-consent regulation, using language that
echoed abortion opponents’ claims that abortion hurt women.250 “In
attempting to ensure that a woman apprehend the full consequences
of her decision,” the Court stated, “the State furthers the legitimate
purpose of reducing the risk that a woman may elect an abortion, only
to discover later, with devastating psychological consequences, that
her decision was not fully informed.”251
Casey energized abortion opponents committed to arguing that
abortion hurt women.252 Abortion opponents first expanded on the
mandated-counseling model upheld in Casey.253 While Casey said
nothing about the regulation of abortion clinics, abortion opponents
also wanted to push laws designed to protect women’s physical and
mental health.254 Targeted-clinic regulations like HB 2 were advertised as a way of guaranteeing women a higher quality of care and
putting substandard providers out of business.255
Texas lawmakers patterned HB 2 on the Women’s Health Protection Act and the Abortion Providers Privileging Act, model laws
crafted by AUL.256 In July 2013, Governor Rick Perry signed into law
both parts of HB 2.257 The following September, a group of abortion
providers sought the facial invalidation of the admitting-privileges
measure.258 Although the district court enjoined enforcement of the
250.
251.
252.
253.
254.
255.

See id. at 881.
Id. at 882.
See infra notes 253, 255, and accompanying text.
On the push for these laws, see Americans United for Life, supra note 247, at 3.
See infra note 255 and accompanying text.
For an example of an argument of this kind, see, for example, Americans United
for Life, Fundraising Letter (Oct. 18, 2000), in THE MILDRED F. JEFFERSON PAPERS (on file in Box 13, Folder 6, Schlesinger Library, Harvard University). On
the spread of these arguments, see, for example, Targeted Regulation of Abortion
Providers, GUTTMACHER INST., https://www.guttmacher.org/state-policy/explore/
targeted-regulation-abortion-providers [https://perma.unl.edu/5DRQ-64CY] (last
updated Aug. 1, 2017).
256. On the AUL model legislation, see, for example, AMS. UNITED FOR LIFE, ABORTION
PROVIDERS’ ADMITTING PRIVILEGES ACT: MODEL LEGISLATION & POLICY GUIDE FOR
THE 2015 LEGISLATIVE YEAR (2014), http://www.aul.org/downloads/2015-Legislative-Guides/Abortion/Abortion_Providers_Admitting_Privileges_Act_-_2015_LG
.pdf [https://perma.unl.edu/4VCK-WNCE]; AMS. UNITED FOR LIFE, WOMEN’S
HEALTH PROTECTION ACT (ABORTION CLINIC REGULATIONS): MODEL LEGISLATION &
POLICY GUIDE FOR THE 2013 LEGISLATIVE YEAR (2012), http://www.aul.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/11/Womens-Health-Protection-Act-Abortion-Clinic-Regulations-2013-LG.pdf [https://perma.unl.edu/KQ44-FSEE].
257. On the filibuster and the signing of the law, see Jayme Fraser & Kolten Parker,
Perry Signs Abortion Bill as Opponents Vow to Battle On, HOUS. CHRON., July 19,
2013, at A1.
258. Planned Parenthood of Greater Tex. Surgical Health Servs. v. Abbott, 951 F.
Supp. 2d 891 (W.D. Tex. 2013).
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law, the Fifth Circuit reversed only days later, and the admitting-privileges provision went into effect.259
A week after the Fifth Circuit’s decision, providers challenged the
ambulatory-surgical-center provision and argued that the admittingprivileges provision was unconstitutional, at least as applied to facilities in McAllen and El Paso.260 At trial, the parties stipulated that
only seven facilities in major cities would be able to comply with the
ASC provision.261 Texas offered several expert witnesses in support of
HB 2.262 State witnesses claimed that the ASC provision was justified
because any abortion required entry into the uterus, a matter best
performed in sterile facilities like hospitals.263 State witnesses reiterated that an admitting-privilege requirement would improve the
credentialing of abortion providers and guarantee women better continuity of care.264
Following the trial, the district court enjoined enforcement of the
two provisions, and the Fifth Circuit again reversed.265 Because that
court had already rejected a challenge to the admitting-privilege regulation, the court held that the district court had directly violated the
rule of res judicata.266 Texas also argued that res judicata barred the
challenge to the ASC requirement because the providers could have
challenged it in 2013 and opted not to do so.267 While holding that res
judicata did stand in the way, the court nevertheless reached the merits of the challenge to the ASC restriction.268 Concluding that the law
ensured that women received only the best medical care, the court rejected any suggestion that the law was designed to restrict abortion
access.269
Nor, according to the Fifth Circuit, did the ASC measure have an
impermissible effect under Casey.270 The court found that even if the
law would require seventeen percent of women in the state to travel
150 miles or more, that number was not high enough to satisfy the
“large fraction” test set out in Casey.271 Here, the Fifth Circuit invoked the logic of Maher and Harris: if poor, young, or minority wo259. For the Fifth Circuit’s decision reversing the injunction, see Planned Parenthood
of Greater Tex. Surgical Health Servs. v. Abbott, 734 F.3d 406 (5th Cir. 2013).
260. Whole Woman’s Health v. Lakey, 46 F. Supp. 3d 673, 680–84 (W.D. Tex. 2014).
261. See id.
262. See id.
263. See id.
264. See id.
265. For the district court’s decision on the merits, see id. For the Fifth Circuit’s decision, see Whole Woman’s Health v. Cole, 790 F.3d 563, 581–92 (5th Cir. 2015).
266. See Cole, 790 F.3d at 581–84.
267. See id.
268. See id.
269. See id. 582–83.
270. See id. at 581–90.
271. See id.
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men would struggle to obtain an abortion after HB 2, their problems
came from their existing circumstances, not from HB 2.272 When it
came to the small number of ASCs currently operating in the state,
the Fifth Circuit found that plaintiffs had failed to meet their burden
of showing that ASCs could not expand and serve a larger clientele.273
When the Supreme Court agreed to hear Whole Woman’s Health,
AUL and other antiabortion groups relied on Harris in defending HB
2. AUL compared HB 2 to a Louisiana statute, upheld by the Fifth
Circuit, that exempted abortion providers from a state statute limiting
medical practice liability.274 According to AUL, the constitutionality
of HB 2 and the Louisiana law flowed directly from Harris.275 While
Louisiana’s law might make it impossible for providers to obtain liability insurance, providers did not face a state-created, formal obstacle.276 Similarly, “any claimed inability of Plaintiffs to comply with
the ambulatory surgical center requirement is not of the State’s creation, and cannot be counted an ‘undue burden.’ ”277
An amicus brief on behalf of the United States Conference of Catholic Bishops and other antiabortion organizations made Harris and
Maher the centerpiece of their defense of HB 2.278 All of the reasons
that it would be hard for clinics to comply with HB 2 had nothing to do
with the government.279 If “a private leasing opportunity fell through
due to hostility to abortion” or “poverty makes it difficult for some women to obtain an abortion,” the government could not be blamed.280
The United States Conference of Catholic Bishops explained:
“Casey only forbids an undue burden by the government on the decision whether to have an abortion.”281
Texas relied on Harris both in leaning on the right–privilege distinction and in justifying the singling out of objections to abortion.282
Harris had made clear that “[a]bortion is inherently different from
other medical procedures” and that the state had more latitude in sin272. See id.
273. See id. at 584–89.
274. See Amicus Curiae Brief of 44 Texas Legislators in Support of Defendant-Appellants and Reversal of the District Court at 20–22, Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt, 136 S. Ct. 2292 (2016) (No. 15-274) [hereinafter Brief of 44 Texas
Legislators].
275. See id. at 22–23.
276. See id.
277. Id. at 23.
278. See Brief of United States Conference of Catholic Bishops et al. as Amici Curiae
Supporting Respondents, Hellerstedt, 136 S. Ct. 2292 (No. 15-274).
279. See id. at 22–24.
280. Id. at 24.
281. Id.
282. See Brief for Respondents at 43–44, Hellerstedt, 136 S. Ct. 2292 (No. 15-274).
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gling it out.283 Moreover, Harris had announced a formalist approach
that legitimized laws that did not “burden” the abortion decision, regardless of their actual impact.284 If HB 2 made it harder for women
to get abortions, the government was not at fault.285 “The State here
has no due-process (or equal-protection) obligation to affirmatively
subsidize abortion,” Texas contended.286
Texas and sympathetic antiabortion groups described Casey’s undue burden test as an extension of Maher and Harris. Casey prohibited laws that created an undue burden, but Texas argued that when
discerning whether such a burden existed, courts should look no further than the surface of a law. The undue burden test required this
kind of formalism, ignoring any question about the real-world impact
of a statute.
Decided in June 2016, the Supreme Court issued an opinion in Hellerstedt that rejected the logic used by Texas and its allies in the antiabortion movement. Writing for a 5–3 majority, Justice Stephen
Breyer dedicated much of his opinion to the issue of res judicata, rejecting the Fifth Circuit’s analysis as to both parts of the Texas law.287
Justice Breyer then took up the most divisive question in the case:
what Casey’s undue burden test actually required.288 The Court first
took issue with the Fifth Circuit’s conclusions about the purpose of the
law.289 The Fifth Circuit had reasoned that if Texas claimed that a
law benefitted women’s health, the courts should defer to that judgment rather than take an independent look at the medical evidence.290 The Court rejected this conclusion, explaining: “The rule
announced in Casey . . . requires that courts consider the burdens a
law imposes on abortion access together with the benefits those laws
confer.”291
Nor did the Court find convincing the argument that legislators
alone should determine the impact of a law.292 Styling a law a benefit
or a burden did not determine the outcome of the undue burden analysis, and lawmakers’ conclusion that a law helped women did not
resolve the issue.293 “The Court, when determining the constitutionality of laws regulating abortion procedures, has placed considerable
283. Id. at 43 (alteration in original) (quoting Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 325
(1908)).
284. See id. at 51–54.
285. See id.
286. Id. at 54.
287. Hellerstedt, 136 S. Ct. at 2302–09.
288. See id. at 2309–11.
289. See id.
290. See id.
291. Id. at 2309.
292. See id. at 2310.
293. See id.
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weight upon evidence and argument presented in judicial proceedings,” Justice Breyer explained.294
The majority offered a few additional clues about the undue burden test involved in its analysis of both Casey and Gonzales v. Carhart, the Court’s most recent abortion decision before Hellerstedt.295
As his majority in Hellerstedt included the author of Carhart, Justice
Anthony Kennedy, Justice Breyer carefully explained how Carhart
had already performed the balancing detailed in Hellerstedt.296 While
acknowledging that Carhart seemed to require deferential review of
legislative fact-finding, Justice Breyer reasoned that Carhart did
nothing to change the Court’s “constitutional duty to review factual
findings where constitutional rights are at stake.”297 According to the
majority, Carhart had weighed Congress’s findings on dilation-and-extraction abortion against record evidence that conflicted with
lawmakers’ conclusions. Thoughtful analysis, not “uncritical deference,” was the hallmark of Carhart.298
Breyer maintained that Casey had also balanced the burdens and
benefits of a spousal-notification and parental-involvement law, relying “heavily on the District Court’s factual findings and the researchbased submissions of amici in declaring a portion of the [spousal-notification measure] unconstitutional.”299 As Breyer described it, the undue burden test required a similarly thorough consideration of any
legislative findings, as well as evidence in the record, particularly expert testimony.300
The Court’s application of the undue burden test was also revealing. First, the Court rejected a formalist approach to analysis of
HB 2’s benefits.301 Carefully reviewing the record evidence, the Court
found no proof that the admitting-privileges requirement would improve health outcomes for women.302 When it came to the effect of the
admitting-privileges law, the Court attributed the closure of most of
the clinics in the state to HB 2, notwithstanding the fact that the law’s
sting depended partly on surrounding circumstances that the state did
not control.303 The Court acknowledged that many hospitals would
not grant clinics admitting privileges for reasons outside the power of
the government, including requirements that an “applicant has
treated a high number of patients in the hospital setting in the past
294.
295.
296.
297.
298.
299.
300.
301.
302.
303.

Id.
See id.
See id.
Id.
Id. (quoting Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 166 (2007)).
Id.
See id.
See id. at 2311–13.
See id.
See id.
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year, clinical data requirements, [or] residency requirements.”304 Nevertheless, when HB 2 interacted with these background factors, a significant number of women lost access to abortion services.305
Nor did it change the Court’s analysis that the problems women
encountered after HB 2 resulted partly from other factors outside the
government’s control. The Court insisted that HB 2 would create an
undue burden by ensuring that women confronted “fewer doctors,
longer waiting times, and increased crowding.”306 That women faced
more expense, inconvenience, and lost access stemmed partly from
factors unrelated to HB 2, including a woman’s economic status or
place of residence.307 Nonetheless, the Court recognized that the realworld impact of HB 2 was the same as a regulation that more formally
restricted abortion.308
The Court’s analysis of the ASC provision was also in tension with
the formalism of Harris and Maher. In those cases, the Government
claimed (and the Court accepted with little question) that the law encouraged childbirth over abortion. By contrast, in Hellerstedt, the
Court did not accept at face value the argument that the ASC provision guaranteed better outcomes for women.309 After looking at the
record evidence, the Court instead reasoned that the regulation had
no tangible health benefit at all.310 In assessing the effect of the ASC
regulation, the Court emphasized that existing facilities might not be
able to accommodate the demand that would arise if more clinics
closed.311 Moreover, the majority suggested that HB2 would create an
undue burden even if ASCs could serve more patients.312 “Patients
seeking these services [would be] less likely to get the kind of individualized attention, serious conversation, and emotional support that doctors at less taxed facilities may have offered,” the Court explained.313
Hellerstedt attracted attention because it rejected the idea that the
undue burden standard was no different than rational basis review.
By putting teeth in the standard, Hellerstedt ensured that more abortion regulations were constitutionally questionable. However, as this
Part argues next, the transformation of the undue burden standard
may be particularly relevant to potential challenges to the Hyde
Amendment and to the very distinction between negative and positive
rights.
304.
305.
306.
307.
308.
309.
310.
311.
312.
313.

Id. at 2312.
See id.
Id. at 2313.
See id.
See id.
See id. at 2314–16.
See id.
See id. at 2316–18.
See id. at 2315–18.
See id. at 2318.
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Reexamining the Hyde Amendment

Hellerstedt casts doubt on the constitutionality of core justifications for the Hyde Amendment and laws like it, including those involving private-insurance coverage for abortion. Hellerstedt first
requires a consideration of the benefit achieved by a law—something
that must be established using tangible record evidence.314 The purposes set forth for the Hyde Amendment have varied, but three command the most attention. First, supporters of the bill echoed the claim
made in Maher and Harris that the Hyde Amendment was designed to
encourage childbirth rather than abortion.315 Second, proponents emphasized that the Amendment vindicated the complicity-based objections of those who believed that paying tax to support abortion would
violate their conscience.316 Finally, some proponents of the Hyde
Amendment have presented it as a cost-saving mechanism, emphasizing that budgetary constraints limit what kind of services the state
can guarantee.317
None of these purposes would obviously fare well under Hellerstedt. States may argue that Hellerstedt applies only to laws involving
the protection of women’s health, not to fetal-protective laws like the
Hyde Amendment. However, this argument fails based on the reasoning of Hellerstedt itself. The majority emphasized that the balancing
approach had already applied to fetal-protective laws, including those
in Casey and Carhart.318 The Court has not clearly indicated that Hellerstedt will apply to woman-centered laws like HB 2.319
How would Hellerstedt deal with the purposes set forth for the
Hyde Amendment? First, there is no compelling evidence that the
Hyde Amendment actually encourages more women to carry
pregnancies to term. Starting in 1981, studies have suggested that the
Amendment discouraged relatively few women—roughly four to six
percent—from terminating their pregnancies.320 Research suggests
instead that the Hyde Amendment has shifted the expense of abortions for poor women from the public to the private sector, placing a
financial burden on poor women themselves or on abortion provid314. See id. at 2308–10.
315. See Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 324–25 (1980); Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464,
478–79 (1977).
316. See supra Part I.
317. See, e.g., IRVING B. HARRIS, CHILDREN IN JEOPARDY: CAN WE BREAK THE CYCLE OF
POVERTY? 204 (1996).
318. See Hellerstedt, 136 S. Ct. at 2309–10.
319. See id.
320. See, e.g., Willard Cates, The Hyde Amendment in Action, 246 J. AM. MED. ASS’N
1109, 1109–14 (1981).
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ers.321 The evidence on state funding restrictions suggests a similarly
modest effect: a 1.9–2.4% increase in reported live births.322
While the Hyde Amendment may have resulted in some increase in
the number of women carrying pregnancies to term, it is far from clear
that the effect has been significant. Nor is it even obvious that increasing the number of live births would qualify as the same kind of obvious benefit set out by Texas in Hellerstedt. Those on opposing sides of
the abortion conflict would agree that making abortion safer for women is desirable. The same consensus would not apply to the idea that
an increase in live births is always better, regardless of the underlying
circumstances of a woman carrying a pregnancy to term.
What about the interest in protecting the conscience-based objections of taxpayers who disapprove of abortions? To be sure, the Hyde
Amendment sends a message that taxpayer monies will not fund
Medicaid abortions. However, the impact of the Amendment is more
attenuated, particularly if it is framed as protection for those who feel
that they have wrongly been forced to support abortion. The recent
push to deny any state and federal funding for organizations that perform abortions relies on the idea that taxpayers are still wrongly obligated to subsidize abortions.323 A recent Forbes study estimated that
taxpayers subsidize roughly twenty-four percent of the annual costs of
abortions, but the majority of the burden falls on state taxpayers, a
group unaffected by the Hyde Amendment.324 The Amendment cannot remove any indirect subsidy for abortion or assure those who define their complicity in idiosyncratic or unusually broad ways. As a
result, the Hyde Amendment is not a particularly effective way of
guaranteeing that no taxpayer feels complicit in abortion.
Even the evidence on the cost-saving benefits of the Hyde Amendment is somewhat dubious. Supporters of the Hyde Amendment point
to the relatively high cost of an abortion procedure, particularly after
321. See id.
322. See, e.g., Carol Korenbrot, Claire Brindis & Fran Priddy, Trends in Rates of Live
Births and Abortions Following State Restrictions on Public Funding of Abortion,
105 PUB. HEALTH REP. 555, 555 (1990).
323. For complicity arguments used in the effort to defund Planned Parenthood, see,
for example, Are My Tax Dollars Paying for Abortion?, RIGHT TO LIFE MICH.
(2011), https://rtl.org/RLMNews/09editions/AreMyTaxDollarsPayingForAbortion
.htm [https://perma.unl.edu/866T-T7XE]; Janell Ross, How Planned Parenthood
Actually Uses Its Funding, WASH. POST (Aug. 4, 2015) https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-fix/wp/2015/08/04/how-planned-parenthood-actuallyuses-its-federal-funding [https://perma.unl.edu/BXD7-FGED].
324. For the Forbes study, see Chris Conover, Are American Taxpayers Paying for
Abortions?, FORBES (Oct. 5, 2015), http://www.forbes.com/sites/theapothecary/
2015/10/02/are-american-taxpayers-paying-for-abortion/#60083d0c7709 [https://
perma.unl.edu/PKL9-8PNB].
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the first trimester.325 Even if the Amendment has led to only modest
reductions in the abortion rate, that reduction could mean significant
savings for taxpayers.326
However, any savings may be more than offset by added costs. Research indicates that Medicaid recipients seeking to terminate a pregnancy have to make painful financial choices, often putting off bills for
food, rent, and other necessities to assemble adequate funds for abortion.327 In turn, these delays tend to only increase the cost of an abortion, particularly after the second trimester begins.328 As the cost of a
procedure increases, the financial burden on poor women also climbs,
suggesting that the Hyde Amendment requires more women to seek
supplementary forms of public assistance, particularly if they are unable to end a pregnancy.329
Even if a court found some evidence that the Hyde Amendment
achieved its stated goals, it would be hard for defenders of the law to
maintain that those benefits outweigh the Amendment’s costs. Opponents of the Hyde Amendment point to several kinds of burdens created by the law: delays in obtaining access to abortion, additional
financial strain, and practical obstacles to receiving any abortion
whatsoever.330
Abortion opponents once successfully defended the Hyde Amendment against these charges in two ways. First, the Amendment’s proponents insisted that these burdens result not from the Hyde
325. For antiabortion arguments about the savings created by the Hyde Amendment,
see, for example, Arina Grossu, The Hyde Amendment Has Saved 2 Million Lives.
Democrats Want to Kill It, FEDERALIST (Sept. 30, 2016), http://thefederalist.com/
2016/09/30/hyde-amendment-saved-2-million-lives-democrats-want-end [https://
perma.unl.edu/5AGT-CRUC]; Chris Smith, The Life-Saving Amendment, WASH.
TIMES (Sept. 29, 2016), http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2016/sep/29/hydeamendment-has-saved-two-million-americans-fro [https://perma.unl.edu/R54A9YTU].
326. See supra note 325 and accompanying text.
327. See, e.g., STANLEY K. HENSHAW ET AL., GUTTMACHER INST., RESTRICTIONS ON MEDICAID FUNDING FOR ABORTIONS: A LITERATURE REVIEW (2009), https://www
.guttmacher.org/sites/default/files/report_pdf/medicaidlitreview.pdf [https://per
ma.unl.edu/9EN8-HKX7]; JENNA JERMAN ET AL., GUTTMACHER INST., CHARACTERISTICS OF U.S. ABORTION PATIENTS IN 2014 AND CHANGES SINCE 2008 (2016), http:/
/www.guttmacher.org/sites/default/files/report_pdf/characteristics-us-abortionpatients-2014.pdf [https://perma.unl.edu/9SCU-2DMY].
328. See, e.g., Jenna Jerman & Rachel K. Jones, Secondary Measures of Access to
Abortion Services in the United States, 2011 and 2012: Gestational Age Limits,
Cost, and Harassment, in 24 WOMEN’S HEALTH ISSUES 419, 419–424 (2014); Sarah
C.M. Roberts et al., Out-of-Pocket Costs and Insurance Coverage for Abortion in
the United States, 24 WOMEN’S HEALTH ISSUES 211, 211–214 (2014).
329. See, e.g., Heather D. Boonstra, Abortion in the Lives of Women Struggling Financially: Why Insurance Coverage Matters, 19 GUTTMACHER POL’Y REV. 46 (2016),
https://www.guttmacher.org/sites/default/files/article_files/gpr1904616_0.pdf
[https://perma.unl.edu/V985-MFMS].
330. See, e.g., id.; Bahn & Taylor, supra note 1.
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Amendment but from women’s personal circumstances.331 If a woman
requires time to put together the money for an abortion, her limited
financial circumstances cannot be blamed on the state. Similarly, if
she fails to find adequate funds and has to carry a pregnancy to term,
her difficult financial situation cannot be traced back to a state law.
A related argument might suggest that any burden created by the
Hyde Amendment is not onerous enough to raise constitutional concerns.332 If a law like the Amendment merely creates delays or increased expenses for women seeking abortions, the argument goes,
that alone would not create an undue burden. After all, the twentyfour-hour waiting period upheld in Casey increased expense, travel
times, and delays for women, particularly poor, young, and nonwhite
women, but the Supreme Court nevertheless upheld it.333
Hellerstedt raises questions about whether either of these defenses
will remain convincing. First consider the argument that the burdens
created by the Hyde Amendment result from a woman’s poverty
rather than from state intervention. The Hellerstedt Court explicitly
rejected this logic as applied to HB 2.334 Texas and AUL both argued
that clinics could not comply with HB 2 for reasons having nothing to
do with the state, including the reasons that hospitals chose to grant
admitting privileges, the resources available to clinics seeking to expand their capacity or comply with ASC regulations, and the place of
residence of women seeking abortions.335
The majority found this claim unpersuasive.336 In tracing the effect of the law, the Court considered how HB 2 intersected with existing political, financial, and medical trends rather than analyzing
the law in isolation.337 The fact that hospitals often refused to grant
abortion providers admitting privileges because of low admission rates
from clinics did nothing to undermine the challenge to HB 2.338 Ac331. Cf. Brief Amicus Curiae of Texas Eagle Forum et al., 20–21, Whole Woman’s
Health v. Hellerstedt, 136 S. Ct. 2292 (2016) (No. 15-274); Brief of 68 Texas State
Legislators et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Appellants, 14 & n.15, Whole Woman’s Health v. Lakey, 135 S. Ct. 399 (2014) (No. 14-50928).
332. Cf. Brief Amicus of Texas Eagle Forum et al., supra note 331, at 19–20 (“To the
contrary, when a state ‘law . . . serves a valid purpose’ (as HB2 does) and ‘has the
incidental effect of making it more difficult or more expensive to procure an abortion,’ the added difficulty or expense ‘cannot be enough to invalidate it.’ ” (alteration in original) (quoting Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833,
874 (1992))).
333. See, e.g., Casey, 505 U.S. at 874.
334. See Hellerstedt, 136 S. Ct. at 2309–18.
335. E.g., Brief for Respondents, supra note 282, at 51–54; see Brief of 44 Texas Legislators, supra note 274 at 20–22; Brief of United States Conference of Catholic
Bishops et al., supra note 278, at 21–24.
336. See Hellerstedt, 136 S. Ct. at 2313–18.
337. See id.
338. See id.
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cording to the Court, the law was unconstitutional because of its interaction with other factors shaping access to abortion care.339
The same reasoning applies to the Hyde Amendment. The Amendment devastates poor women neither because they are poor nor because the law, on its face, creates formal sanctions. Instead, the
interplay between the Amendment and poor women’s financial struggles creates the kind of delays and increased health risks so often
highlighted by the Amendment’s critics. Hellerstedt departs from existing precedent by looking beyond the text of a law to its impact in
the real world. Such an analysis would make it much harder to justify
the Hyde Amendment.
The second justification for the Hyde Amendment—that any burden it creates is minimal—may not hold up well under Hellerstedt.
The Court defined constitutionally problematic burdens far more
broadly than the ones laid out in Casey.340 Hellerstedt dignifies increased expenses, long travel distances, and delays in access as burdens that matter under Casey.341 Indeed, the Court suggests that a
law might create an undue burden if it guarantees that women will
receive a lower quality of care, even if the procedure remains
available.342
Hellerstedt might also spell trouble for recent laws that expand on
the Hyde Amendment model. Recently, abortion opponents have
pushed model legislation based on AUL’s Abortion Coverage Prohibition Act, a law that would prohibit private insurance plans from covering abortion.343 Some variations of the law, like one passed by
Michigan, allow consumers to purchase an “abortion rider” with an
additional premium.344 Ten states have passed laws blocking abortion
coverage in any private insurance plan, while an additional twentyfive prohibit abortion coverage in any policy offered through insurance
exchanges.345 Even the theoretical availability of abortion riders may
mean very little, given that only a limited number of insurers make
them available.346
339. See id.
340. Compare id. at 2318, with Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833,
874 (1992).
341. See Hellerstedt, 136 S. Ct. at 2318.
342. See id.
343. See AMS. UNITED FOR LIFE, ABORTION COVERAGE PROHIBITION ACT: MODEL LEGISLATION & POLICY GUIDE FOR THE 2016 LEGISLATIVE YEAR (2015), http://aul.org/
downloads/2016-Legislative-Guides/Defunding-Abortion-Industry/Abortion_Cov
erage_Prohibition_Act_-_2016_LG.pdf [https://perma.unl.edu/7YUD-UUVN].
344. See Restricting Insurance Coverage of Abortion, GUTTMACHER INST., https://www
.guttmacher.org/state-policy/explore/restricting-insurance-coverage-abortion
[https://perma.unl.edu/X677-XLBM] (last updated Aug. 1, 2017).
345. See, e.g., id.
346. After Michigan passed its insurance ban, for example, only seven insurers stated
that they would offer an abortion rider and promised to do so only for those with
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The defense of these laws relies heavily on Maher and Harris.
Much like Medicaid prohibitions, insurance bans do not prevent women from obtaining abortion care; any obstacle stems instead from the
market price of abortion and women’s personal financial circumstances.347 Hellerstedt makes this argument less effective. The Court
defines a broader category of cognizable burdens, including delays, increased costs, and a decline in the quality of services.348 The kind of
increased expense or obstacle to access created by insurance-coverage
bills—totaling hundreds to tens of thousands of dollars—seems no
less serious than the travel distances, delays, or declines in personalized care emphasized by Hellerstedt. The Court’s recent decision also
makes it much harder to rely on the funding cases in defending an
insurance ban. The defense of insurance bans also invokes the claim
that a woman’s inability to pay for an abortion without insurance
stems from factors outside the control of the government.349 But in
Hellerstedt, the Court found no merit in this argument.350
When explaining why HB 2 had an impermissible effect, the Court
emphasized how the law interacted with hospital policies, market
prices, and providers’ budgets.351 Insurance bans promise to limit access to abortion in similar ways. While the state may not have a say
about which private insurance plans offer abortion riders, an insurance ban would sharply increase the costs of abortion for many women
partly because such riders are rarely available. HB 2 also troubled the
Court because it created a perfect storm—one based on the details of
the law, the financial circumstances of clinics in the state, and the
nature of hospital admitting policies. Michigan’s recent insurance restriction could have a similar effect: the paucity of insurance riders
and the rising costs of abortion could put the procedure out of reach
for many women.
Hellerstedt may also create problems for those defending state and
federal proposals to defund care providers, like Planned Parenthood,
that also offer abortion services. Starting in 2015, twenty-four states
passed such laws. Of those twenty-four, seventeen would prevent family-planning organizations from receiving Medicaid reimbursement for
other services if they performed or advocated abortions; fourteen introduced such a ban regarding state family-planning funding, and an

347.
348.
349.
350.
351.

employer-sponsored plans. See, e.g., Ashley Woods, Michigan’s “Rape Insurance”
Abortion Rider Law Goes into Effect Today, HUFFINGTON POST (Mar. 14, 2014),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2014/03/13/michigans-abortion-rider-_n_4958517
.html [https://perma.unl.edu/LY25-H69L].
For an argument of this kind in defense of an insurance ban, see ACLU of Kan. &
W. Mo. v. Praeger, 917 F. Supp. 2d 1179, 1188–89 (D. Kan. 2013).
See Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt, 136 S. Ct. 2292, 2318 (2016).
See Praeger, 917 F. Supp. 2d at 1188–89.
See Hellerstedt, 136 S. Ct. at 2313–18.
See id.
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additional ten blocked such organizations from receiving other state
monies, including those for sexually transmitted-infection or breastcancer testing.352 While the courts have sometimes enjoined enforcement of these laws,353 they still represent an important part of antiabortion strategy.
The case state lawmakers make for these laws relies heavily on
Harris and Maher. In advocating for its recent defunding law, for example, Ohio stressed that “state legislatures have ‘wide latitude in
choosing among competing demands for limited public funds.’ ”354 The
challenge to such laws generally relies on the unconstitutional-conditions doctrine, arguing that such laws impermissibly condition receipt
of a benefit on the surrender of the right to abortion or free
speech.355 When this argument has fallen short, courts have often relied on the idea, drawn from Maher and Harris, that “a federal subsidy program is fundamentally different from ‘direct state
interference’ with a particular activity.”356
Even laws excluding abortion providers from laws limiting malpractice liability seem less constitutionally acceptable after Hellerstedt. Louisiana passed a law in 2010 that prohibited doctors from
receiving medical-malpractice insurance if they performed elective
abortions.357 The Fifth Circuit looked to the funding cases in upholding the law:
This exemption may make it difficult—perhaps prohibitively difficult—for
those providers to obtain the relevant insurance. But . . . [the law] is merely a
“means of unequal subsidization of abortion and other medical services.” And
while “government may not place obstacles in the path of a woman’s exercise
of her freedom of choice, it need not remove those” obstacles, like Louisiana’s
dearth of affordable insurance, that are “not of [the government’s] own creation.” Of course, in some sense, Louisiana’s healthcare market is a function of
the laws operative in that state. But that is also true, in some sense, of the
“[i]ndigency” described in Harris v. McRae as an obstacle for which the government is not responsible.358
352. Elizabeth Nash et al., Laws Affecting Reproductive Health and Rights: State
Trends at Midyear, 2016, GUTTMACHER INST. (July 2016), https://www
.guttmacher.org/article/2016/07/laws-affecting-reproductive-health-and-rightsstate-trends-midyear-2016 [https://perma.unl.edu/XMY5-ELZA].
353. For a sample of these decisions, see Planned Parenthood Ass’n of Utah v. Herbert, 828 F.3d 1245 (10th Cir. 2016); Planned Parenthood of Greater Ohio v.
Hodges, 201 F. Supp. 3d 898 (S.D. Ohio 2016); Planned Parenthood of Sw. and
Cent. Fla. v. Phillip, 194 F. Supp. 3d 1213 (N.D. Fla. 2016).
354. Hodges, 201 F. Supp. 3d at 902 (quoting Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 479 (1977)).
355. See id. at 903.
356. Id. at 911 (quoting Maher, 432 U.S. at 475).
357. See LA. STAT. ANN. § 1231.2 (2015) (originally enacted as LA. REV. STAT.
§ 40:1299.42(B)(1)).
358. K.P. v. LeBlanc, 729 F.3d 427, 442–43 (5th Cir. 2013) (second and third alterations in original) (quoting Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 316–17 (1980)).
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Hellerstedt cannot easily be reconciled with the Fifth Circuit’s reasoning. When considering the effect of a challenged regulation, the decision requires a court to consider how a law interacts with obstacles
that are not of the government’s creation. It is no defense that the
government took advantage of surrounding circumstances to create a
restriction with the same practical impact as a formal ban.
Hellerstedt did not directly involve a subsidy program. However,
the Court’s reasoning is in obvious tension with the formalism of Harris and Maher. Hellerstedt should create an important opening for
those who criticize the right–privilege distinction in its entirety. The
framers of HB 2 had relied on Maher and Harris to explain that their
proposal would not directly restrict abortions. As they presented it,
HB 2 put in place neutral regulations intended to protect women’s
health. If abortion clinics could not comply or if women could not
travel to a facility that remained open, Texas did not shoulder any
responsibility. By rejecting this logic, the Court undermined one of the
core rationales for distinguishing between benefit programs and “direct state interference.”
V.

CONCLUSION

Challenges to the Hyde Amendment have recently come to the
forefront of political debate. Hillary Clinton announced plans to challenge the Amendment after her arrival, and then-President Elect Donald Trump pledged to make the Amendment a permanent feature of
American law.359 All Above All, a coalition of reproductive-justice organizations, has launched a nationwide initiative to build opposition
to the Hyde Amendment using social media and visits to college campuses.360 The Equal Access to Abortion Coverage in Health Insurance
Act (EACH Woman Act), a proposed bill with well over one hundred
cosponsors, would reverse the Hyde Amendment and other federal
bans, and outlaw bans in the context of private insurance.361
The history of the Hyde Amendment helps to explain the importance of these new campaigns. The Amendment helped to give rise to
complicity-based ideas of conscience that have shaped contemporary
battles about same-sex marriage, sexual-orientation discrimination,
contraception, and abortion. Supporters of the Hyde Amendment insisted on conscience-based exemptions regardless of the degree of direct involvement a law required. Abortion opponents argued that if a
law subsidized something to which taxpayers object, the message
alone of that law created an onerous burden on the taxpayer’s conscience. The same reasoning shapes the conscience-based claims of
359. See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
360. See, e.g., Green, supra note 2.
361. See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
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those seeking to refuse service to same-sex couples, challenge the contraceptive mandate of the Affordable Care Act, or defend new abortion
restrictions.
The battle for the Hyde Amendment also helped to create a constitutional right–privilege distinction that has had considerable influence ever since. Supporters of the Hyde Amendment revived the
distinction and gave it more doctrinal heft, urging the courts to ignore
burdens not formally created by state law.
Hellerstedt has put both the Hyde Amendment and the
right–privilege distinction on shakier ground. The Court’s decision requires proof that a law actually delivers on the promises of its sponsors—a requirement that may be hard to meet for those relying on
cost saving, discouraging abortion, or protecting conscience-based objections. Hellerstedt also upends the Court’s analysis of what counts as
an impermissible constitutional effect. Far from ordering a court to
disregard the background circumstances and to focus on the formal
text of a law, Hellerstedt makes those circumstances a central part of
Casey’s undue burden analysis. The Hyde Amendment has been a
prominent feature of American constitutional jurisprudence for decades, but the outcome of an attack on it may now be as realistic as it
is important.

